The Singapore Real Estate Investment Trust (S-REIT) by Hoo, Suet Fun
Hoo, Suet Fun (2010) The Singapore Real Estate 
Investment Trust (S-REIT). [Dissertation (University of 
Nottingham only)] (Unpublished) 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/23647/1/Cmb1.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
· Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to 
the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.
· To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in Nottingham 
ePrints has been checked for eligibility before being made available.
· Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-
for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge provided that the authors, title 
and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the 
original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.
· Quotations or similar reproductions must be sufficiently acknowledged.
Please see our full end user licence at: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
   Page i 
 Contents 
 
Acknowledgements 
Contents 
 
 
Chapter 1  Introduction 
 1.1 Synopsis      ……………..Page 1 
 1.2 Methodology      ……………..Page 1 
 1.3 Organisation of the Study    ……………..Page 2 
 1.4 What are REITs ?     ……………..Page 3 
 1.5 REITs Origins in U.S.     ……………..Page 3 
 1.6 S-REITs Lumbering Initiation    ……………..Page 4 
 1.7 Limitation and Scope of the Study   ……………..Page 5 
 1.8 Summary      ……………..Page 5 
 
 
Chapter 2  Literature Review 
 2.1 Introduction      ……………..Page 6 
 2.2 Books on REITs     ……………..Page 6 
 2.3 Academic Research Papers    ……………..Page 7 
 2.4 Other Sources of Research Materials and Data ……………..Page 10 
 2.5 Summary      ……………..Page 12 
 
 
Chapter 3 Investment Vehicle - REIT 
 3.1 Introduction      ……………..Page 13 
 3.2 Investors’ Perspectives    ……………..Page 13 
 3.3 Property Owners’ Perspectives   ……………..Page 14 
 3.4 Risks in REITs Investment     ……………..Page 15 
 3.5 Quality of Good Management   ……………..Page 18 
 3.6 Relationship between Sponsor, Manager and Unit Holders……..Page 19 
 3.7 Market Indices in Singapore    ……………..Page 21 
 3.8 Financial Aspects of REITs    ……………..Page 22 
 3.9 Summary      ……………..Page 23 
 
 
   Page ii 
Chapter 4 S-REITs 
 4.1 Introduction      ……………..Page 24 
 4.2 List of S-REITs and the Market Capitalisation ……………..Page 24 
 4.3 S-REITs Typical Structure    ……………..Page 25 
 4.4 MAS Guidelines     ……………..Page 25 
 4.5 Tax Incentives      ……………..Page 27 
 4.6 Profile of S-REITs’ Manager and Share Holders ……………..Page 28 
 4.7  Ownership and Management of S-REITs  ……………..Page 29 
 4.8 Impetus for S-REITs Creation   ……………..Page 31 
 4.9 The Initial S-REITs     ……………..Page 31 
 4.10 Possible S-REITs future developments  ……………..Page 33 
 4.11 Summary      ……………..Page 36 
 
 
Chapter 5 S-REITs Performance Through the Global Credit Crunch 
 5.1 Introduction      ……………..Page 37 
 5.2 S-REITs Performance Before Financial Crisis ……………..Page 37 
 5.3 S-REITs Turning Point in 2007   ……………..Page 38 
 5.4 S-REITs Not Spared from the Economic Crisis in 2008 and 2009..Page 40 
 5.5 S-REITs Capital Returns    ……………..Page 47 
 5.6 S-REITs Prices     ……………..Page 48 
 5.7 S-REITs Gearing Levels    ……………..Page 49 
 5.8 S-REITs Index Performance    ……………..Page 53 
 5.9 S-REITs Volatility     ……………..Page 54 
 5.10 Summary      ……………..Page 54 
 
 
Chapter 6 
 6.1 Observations and Deductions   ……………..Page 55 
 6.2 Caveats to REITs investors    ……………..Page 56 
 6.3 Challenges Ahead – Competitors   ……………..Page 57 
 6.4 Regulation and Corporate Responsibilities  ……………..Page 58 
 6.5 Summary      ……………..Page 58 
 
 
References  
 
   Page iii 
 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 3.1 : FTSE ST Real Estate Index Sector Breakdown 
Figure 4.1: S-REIT Typical Structure 
Figure 5.1 : 5 Year Indices Performance Chart 
 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 3.1 : FTSE ST Real Estate Index Top 10 Constituents 
Table 3.2 : FTSE ST Real Estate Indices Portfolio Characteristics 
Table 4.1 : Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) listed on SGX 
Table 4.2 : S-REITs’ Asset Type, Manager and Major Shareholders 
Table 5.1 : S-REITs Capital Returns 
Table 5.2 : S-REITs Financial Ratios 
Table 5.3 : S-REITs Gearing Ratios 
Table 5.4 : S-REITs Debt Maturity Profile as at End March 2009 
Table 5.5 : FTSE ST Index Series Performance Report - JUNE 2010 
Table 5.6 : STI and FTSE ST Volatility Table (SGD Total Return) 
 
 
 
 
 Page 1 
Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
1.1 Synopsis  
 
The Singapore Real Estate Investment Trust (S-REIT) history is relatively short compared 
to US and Australia. The first REIT in Singapore was listed on Singapore Stock Exchange 
(SGX) 8 years ago by CapitaLand, the largest real estate company in South-east Asia. It 
took the government 6 years to agree to CapitaLand’s REIT suggestion. It took off with 
some ‘glitches’ and today there’s 22 S-REITs listed by various sponsors. In 2008, the S-
REITs total market capitalisation was worth US$19 billion and in June 2010 US$15.5 
billion in the city-state. 
 
The prospect of S-REITs were good, economic fundamentals were strong, market 
confidence was high, more investors were getting familiar with REITs, some REITs IPO 
were in the pipeline, until the US Subprime crisis ‘blow out some lights’ and started the 
‘gloomy weather’ in the financial markets globally. There was a domino effect, blue chips 
were somewhat affected, few were unscathed. Though REITs are advocated as defensive 
investments, S-REITs share prices were also not spared from downward pressures.   
 
The Singapore government has put in measures to ensure some stability and confidence 
in our financial system. Presently, the economic climate has improved but there are still 
some uncertainties in the financial markets. Some S-REITs have managed better and 
some have more difficulties during the credit crunch. 
 
The above motivated my study on S-REITs. It would examine the following : 
 
 The benefits and risks of REITs investments. 
 The development of S-REITs and the profile of the sponsors and managers.  
 The performance of S-REITs through the global financial turbulence.  
 The lessons learnt from the crisis. 
 
1.2 Methodology  
 
In order to achieve the objective of this study, a comprehensive desk research was 
undertaken to gather information regarding elements of REITs, with the emphasis on local 
REITs developments and its statistics. The information sources were from relevant 
research papers, investment research reports, annual reports, books, business 
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magazines, newspaper articles and reliable websites.  
 
The books and research papers provided the basic knowledge and theories on REITs 
such as risks and benefits of this investment instrument. Whereas newspapers, 
investment research reports and business magazines give an account of the current and 
past market conditions, S-REITs announcements and economic data. The financial 
statements from the respective S-REITs’ annual reports are the main source of accounting 
information such as the assets value, level of debts and main unit holders’ portion of 
shares. These are the required information for this study to analyse the financial 
performance and profile of S-REITs. Basically, this revealed how the S-REITs survived 
through the financial crisis and the lessons learnt. 
 
1.3 Organisation of the Study 
 
The following are the issues discussed in the study. 
 
Chapter 2  Literature Review 
This section reviews 2 books, some academic papers and research reports. These 
equipped the author with the fundamental knowledge on the universe of REITs and the 
required tools to analyze the performance of S-REITs. 
 
Chapter 3 Investment Vehicle - REIT 
The benefits and risks of investing in REITs are examined in this chapter. In addition, the 
effect of quality of management and the financial analysis tools are discussed. 
 
Chapter 4 S-REITs 
In this part, the characteristics of the local REITs and the profile of their sponsors and 
managers are uncovered. Some of the S-REIT regulations and tax benefits are also 
highlighted. The initial and possible developments of S-REITs are in later part. 
 
Chapter 5 S-REITs Performance Through the Global Credit Crunch 
This is where most of the data and analysis are. Some of the financial ratios, such as debt 
levels and price to book value, are used to examine and compare the performance of S-
REITs. It showed that all are affected by the financial crisis but some survived better. 
 
Chapter 6 Conclusion 
This section includes some deductions and looks at the lessons learnt from the financial 
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crisis. Mainly, there are inherent risks, REITs are affected by market conditions and not 
what analysts always advocated as defensive investment. Hence they are not perpetually 
resilient to economic downturn.  
 
1.4 What are REITs ?  
 
This is the basic question to be answered first, before proceeding to answer the others laid 
out in section 1.1. in the following chapters. 
 
It is a listed investment vehicle dedicated to owning income-producing property, such as 
office, retail and industrial property, with the purpose of generating regular income for  unit 
holders. REITs’ assets are professionally managed and rentals collected, less off 
management fees and operating expenses, are distributed quarterly or half yearly as 
dividends to unit holders. 
 
Unit holders can buy or sell off the units like other securities listed on the exchanges at 
market-driven prices in real time. In other words, REITs are publicly traded investment 
products, like shares on securities exchange. 
 
REITs allow investors to own a share of its real estate portfolio without the bricks and 
mortar. Therefore, it is a viable conduit to own a portion of chunky assets, especially so for 
retail investors with limited funds. Individual investors can access real property assets and 
share benefits and risks of owning a large portfolio. 
 
REITs seem like hybrids between stocks and bonds because it have both their features. 
That is, unit holders contribute funds to the REITs’ equity, it can be traded publicly just like 
shares and have regular payout like a bond. But the difference is REITs unit holders 
collectively own the underlying assets, not the property company or the debts.  
 
1.5 REITs Origins In U.S. 
 
A study on REITs would not be complete without a brief mention about the U.S. REITs. It 
was created in the United States of America in the 1960, by Congress to allow small 
investors to have indirect access to large-scale income producing real estate investment. 
However, it was only in the 1990s, coinciding with the strong recovery of the U.S. 
economy, that the U.S. equity REITs market grew significantly. Broadly, there are 2 basic 
categories of REITs in U.S. : equity REITs and mortgage REIT.  
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Equity REITs develop, buy, manage and lease in almost every sector. Occasionally, it 
would sell real estates to strengthen their financial status. It is tax advantage, in that it is 
not taxed on the corporate level, and, by law, must pay out at least 90% of its net income 
as dividends to its investors. 
 
Mortgage REITs invest in and originate portfolios of mortgage securities, such as 
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) and collateralized mortgage obligations 
(CMOs). Simply put, it makes and holds loans and other bond-like obligations that are 
secured by real estate collateral. 
 
There are also Hybrid REITs that invest in both real estate equity and real estate 
mortgages. 
 
Though mortgage REITs can deliver impressive returns in good times, but during the 
Subprime Crisis it became a junk investment. On the contrary, well managed equity REITs 
are generally less vulnerable to changes in interest rates and provide a better long term 
investment returns, more stable market-price performance, lower risk, and greater liquidity 
(Block 2006). 
 
1.6 S-REITs Lumbering Initiation 
 
This section would briefly highlight how did REITs begin in Singapore and the ‘first’ S-
REIT that failed to launch. 
 
The road to a dynamic REIT market in Singapore was not smooth-sailing. In order to help 
revitalize the weak property market in 1986, the Property Market Consultative Committee 
was the first to put forward the idea of introducing REITs in Singapore then. The idea did 
not take off until 13 years later, with much lobbying by the Real Estate Developers’ 
Association of Singapore, the guidelines for the formation of REITs were released by the 
de facto central bank of Singapore, Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) on 14 May 
1999. 
 
With the removal of this regulatory hurdle, in November 2001 CapitaLand attempted to set 
up the first S-REIT, SingMall Property Trust (SPT). However, it was pulled out just 
moments before the retail tranche was due to close. This episode served a valuable 
lesson to all potential S-REITs sponsors at that time and spawned the successful launch 
 Page 5 
of other S-REITs in the future. The issues involved would be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
1.7  Limitation and Scope of the Study 
 
This study is based on researched information on the local economic and market 
conditions until 15 July 2010. As the global market conditions are dynamic, thus deviations 
are not unexpected after this date. Therefore, any study done on this similar subject 
subsequently, could draw a different picture as business environments and prospects are 
not static. 
 
While care has been taken to find reliable sources of information and cross checking, the 
accuracy is dependent upon the various providers. 
 
1.8 Summary 
 
In this first chapter, the objective of the study is laid out and some background information 
is highlighted. The appropriate fundamentals and theories from the researched materials 
which are relevant to this study are highlighted in the following Chapter 2 literature review.  
These research materials are also relied upon for the subsequent sections in this study.        
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
In the field of REITs’ research, there are less works done on the emerging Asia REIT 
markets as compared to the U.S. REITs and Australian Listed Property Trusts (LPTs). The 
obvious reason is the relatively short history and depth of the region’s financial markets. 
Nevertheless, there are various local research papers and investment reports on the 
subject that are relevant to this study. Due to time and resources constrains, a limited 
number of articles and books could be covered in this study.  
 
In the following sections, the literatures that are appropriate for this study would be 
discussed. 
 
2.2 Books on REITs 
 
There are 2 books being reviewed. Since REITs was first developed in the U.S. financial 
markets, it would be most appropriate to read a book on the subject matter written by a 
U.S. practitioner. The other is written by a journalist who covers the Asia property 
investment for Reuters.  
 
Investing in REITs by Ralph L. Block 
 
The author has been a participant in the REIT industry in various professional investment 
and advisory capacities since 1993 and has been investing in REIT stocks since 1975. 
This book is suitable for amateur investors because it provides a basic knowledge on the 
REITs without too much financial technicalities. The context and examples are based in 
U.S. but there are some universal concepts that hold true in other regions. 
 
The valid topics to this study which are discussed in the book, include characteristics of 
REITs, the benefits of this investment vehicle versus others, the history and the lesson 
learned, features of ‘Blue chips’ REITs, what are the issues that affect the performance 
and how to measure the financial performance. 
 
The author advocated that a financially good REIT is very much dependent on the effort of 
a reliable manager with a track record of generating growth, prudently manages, and 
makes sound investment decisions with good foresight. He perceived that REITs’ steady 
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streams of rental incomes and low correlations with other assets class make the 
investment defensive in nature and a hedge against inflation. He also pointed out that 
REITs investment is a long term strategy and it complements a diversified and well 
planned portfolio.  
 
The first edition was in 1998 and the latest is 2006. As this book was written before the 
Sub-prime crisis, so the detrimental consequence on the REITs market would not be 
covered. It would be interesting to read this book’s newer edition or any other books on 
REITs in the coming years that would include the denting effects of the crisis, what are the 
lessons learned and how the REITs survived. 
 
Playing the REITs Game - Asia’s New Real Estate Invest Trusts by Dominic Whiting 
 
The author had examined REITs, the exciting new asset class in Asia. The context covers 
various countries in Asia, mainly Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, amongst 
others. Included in the book are case studies and interviews with various financial industry 
players such as bank executives and investment analysts dealing with property 
investments. 
 
The book provides a comprehensive history review of the REITs developments in Asia, 
and touches on some of the fundamentals financial concepts involved. Some of the 
relevant topics presented are similar to Block’s, but the examples are in Asia context.  
 
This author also stressed on the importance of a good manager in the success of a REIT. 
Likewise, he perceived it as a good investment diversification because of the low 
correlations with other stocks and the low volatility of income.  
 
This book was published in 2007; similarly it could not cover the effects of the Sub-prime 
effects on the Asian REITs market. 
 
2.3 Academic Research Papers 
 
For this study, a few of the local university scholars’ research papers are discussed in this 
section. They include Sing Tien Foo, Joseph Ooi and Ong Siew Eng. They have, 
individually or jointly conducted various studies on assets securitization and REITs. Some 
of these academic papers are mathematically complex in content; however the 
conclusions are applicable to this study. 
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Are REITs stocks or real estate? Sing (2005) has answered this fundamental, but critical 
question that has significant impact on the portfolio decision of institutional investors, who 
are allocating a considerable portion of their funds into REITs. It is an equity vehicle 
created by pooling funds exclusively for investment in income-producing properties. 
Furthermore, under Singapore’s REITs guideline, the real estate must constitute at least 
70% of the total asset value. As such, it is logical that investors should look at trends and 
shocks in the property markets when evaluating REITs price performance. On the other 
hand, REITs being listed on the stock exchanges are more liquid and subjected to stock 
market volatility and fluctuations. 
 
In 2005, after analysing the Risk and Returns for S-REITs and Property Stock Portfolios, 
Sing concluded that REITs behaved more like small-capitalized property stocks and it 
outperformed all categories of property stocks. If S-REITs behave more like small-
capitalized property stocks, diversification benefits may be diluted. Nevertheless, the S-
REITs price movement would not be perfectly correlated with stock market price because 
of the unique structure and restrictions imposed upon it. He argues that relationships 
between REIT and direct real estate markets are more controversial.  
 
At that time, there were 6 S-REITs listed as at July 2005, and only 4 were included in the 
analysis. Currently, there are 22 S-REITs listed on the SGX. If the above study is to be 
done now, with the full effects of the Sub-prime crisis included, the results might have 
some deviations. Firstly, in the initial years of the S-REITs, the growth potential, the asset 
portfolios and the economic environment are different from now after the financial crisis. 
Secondly, the variety of S-REITs and the total market capitalization have increased, 
therefore the whole portfolio to be analysed has changed. This would be a challenging 
project topic for future studies. 
 
In 2005 S-REITs were traded at premium to NAV (Net Asset Value), hence yields were 
compressed. This put pressure on non-REIT property companies to enhance the returns 
of assets. It also allows REITs to continue to grow their size through accretive 
acquisitions. In addition, more REITs were listed to take advantage of the market premium 
to book values. Sing highlighted that since there is no restriction on S-REITs to acquire 
overseas properties, it could grow via international diversification through asset 
acquisitions like the Australia’s Listed Property Trust (LPT). Furthermore, Singapore could 
attract cross-border REIT listing with the economically conducive situation (in 2005) and 
the financial infrastructure. Nevertheless, there are competitions from the other newer 
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REIT markets like Hong Kong and Malaysia.   
 
Sing, Sham and Tsai (2007) pointed out that there are scale effects via merger or organic 
growth (by acquisition). In other words, positive economic of scale effects could be 
achieved by larger firms through size efficiency. For example, management economies of 
scale for larger asset size, lower cost of capital, branding image, more bargaining power 
with customer and suppliers. However, the relationship is not linear, meaning that there is 
possible diminishing effect when critical size is reached. Explicitly, size efficiency might 
diminish when the span of control of a REIT is exceeded. So size does matter. Their 
study’s findings implied that REIT asset managers should focus on asset growth strategies 
that are able to generate scale efficiency, in order to generate positive wealth effects for 
shareholders. 
 
Ooi, Newell and Sing (2006) gave an account on the growth of the REIT markets in Asia. 
They examined the REIT regimes, the driving forces, the obstacles in the emerging Asia 
REIT market, and how well the various Asia REIT market performed. They acknowledged 
the importance of government support, the sponsors getting the pricing and the 
constituent properties right, good corporate governance and transparency in the 
successful development of REITs market.  They held that the benefits of REITs are good 
for the real estate markets in Asia and anticipated more cross-country REITs in future. 
Nevertheless, they warned investors about the risk of raising interest costs and 
competition for quality assets which would limit REITs’ growth. 
 
Ong, Ooi and Neo’s (2007) studied the wealth effects of accretive acquisitions in a 
nascent product-market. The research provided some initial evidence to support the yield-
accretive story, which is commonly propagated by REITs in Asia. It showed that the 
market liked the accretive story and rewards acquisitions that result in higher earnings and 
dividends for the shareholders. Apparently, the investors valued growth stories for REITs, 
even though the key attributes of REIT as an investment vehicle are regular stable 
dividend and financial risk diversification. The empirical evidence also revealed that 
shareholders benefited when REIT managers engage in property acquisitions that lead to 
higher earnings. 
 
As the Asia REITs market was at its infant stage, accretive acquisitions seemed to be a 
credible story for newly listed REITs to signal to the market their devotion to increase 
earnings. Moreover, dividend stocks are more valuable in periods of high uncertainty; 
accretive acquisitions might help REITs establish their track records in the early years. 
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They doubted that such yield-accretive game can continue when supply of institutional-
quality properties depletes and as investors become more knowledgeable and 
sophisticated.  
 
In 2003, Sing and Ling examined the role of S-REITs in a Downside Risk Asset Allocation 
Framework. It was based on historical relationships between returns of stocks, bonds and 
a sample of 22 Listed Property Trusts (LPTs) in Australia. The study simulated the ex-post 
returns for Hypothetical Property Trusts (HPTs) over a sample period from March 1995 to 
March 2002. 3 sector-specific HPTs and 1 diversified HPT were constructed by 
substituting the inputs with Singapore stock and bond returns. The results illustrated that 
all 4 HPTs had outperformed local stocks and bonds over the sample period. The low 
correlations of office HPTs and industrial HPTs with stocks indicated that these HPTs 
could diversify the idiosyncratic risks of a mixed-asset portfolio consisting of stocks and 
government bonds. 
 
This study was done when there were only 3 S-REITs. Therefore, HPTs were set up to 
analyze the correlations. If the study is to be done again based on the current 22 S-REITs 
and existing market situation, the results might have some variations. 
 
The above authors’ conclusions might be different if the studies were done after the sub-
prime crisis. Future researchers could pick up where these studies ended to update the 
subject matters and fill the gaps. 
 
The above-mentioned authors’ studies details would also be quoted in the subsequent 
chapters. 
 
2.4 Other Sources of Research Materials and Data     
 
Unpublished thesis 
 
Mei (2002) wrote on whether was there a business case for REITs in Singapore, when the 
first REIT, SPT failed to launch. At that time, local investors were not enticed by what SPT 
had to offer. She explored the possible causes of its failure and held that there were 
compelling reasons for establishing S-REITs. Her conclusion was predictable on hindsight. 
Presently, the number of REITs increased to 22 and the government encourages a local 
hub for cross-border REITs. 
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Investment Research Reports 
 
Pramerica Real Investors put up a paper on global REITs, a new platform of ownership in 
2005. It expected that REITs would have big growth potential internationally though it was 
a small sector in Europe and Asia.  
 
The remarkable growth in the global listed property market has marked the evolution of 
the real estate asset class with the increasing market capitalization due to the fundamental 
demand and supply drivers. The author viewed that the increased demand should 
continue to drive the growth of global listed property sector and especially REITs. 
 
This evolution has several significant implications for the investors and the real estate 
industry. For the investors, growth of public markets for real estate creates more 
opportunities to access attractive return characteristics of property investments, while 
helping to mitigate a fair amount of risks that had previously caused them to avoid this 
asset class. For the industry, the continued development of the public capital markets 
should improved transparency and liquidity throughout the industry. This would make 
capital allocation more rational and efficient.  
 
The paper also put up a caveat on the structural changes that would occur when the 
capital markets matured. This could fundamentally alter the investment performance 
characteristics of the listed property sector, making historical data and trends less 
applicable. Therefore REITs could perform differently in the future in a highly dynamic 
environment as the fluid global listed property market develops. Consequently, the 
volatility and correlations with other asset classes would change. The public markets 
create a stronger link between the property market and the broader capital markets that 
would cause liquidity to fluctuate. It would also lead to better liquidity and transparency 
and reduced risk profile of real estate, resulting to lower future yields. Nonetheless, the 
composition and sources of investment returns from property should not change 
essentially. In other words, the fundamental performance characteristics of the underlying 
assets - stable, attractive yields, modest asset appreciation and low correlations - would 
remain enticing, specifically in the context of a diversified portfolio. 
 
The observations of the study are valid; however it overlooked an important aspect of the 
leverage levels in property investments. The over-geared property buyers and investors in 
the U.S. market and the flawed credit ratings have partly caused a tsunami in the global 
financial markets.  
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Annual Reports, Newspaper Articles and Websites 
 
In order to gather information about the effects of Sub-prime crisis, newspapers articles, 
business magazine write-ups, investment research reports, annual reports, official and 
trustworthy websites are the main source, as they are up-to-date. These provide useful 
financial market announcements and data for this study. 
 
The following are the list of the other literatures : 
 
 Local newspapers : Business Times and Strait Times.  
 Overseas newspaper : Financial Times. 
 Business magazine : Shares Investments (www.sharesinv.com) 
 Annual reports from the respective official websites for the S-REITs 
 The SGX website (www.sgx.com) 
 OCBC Investment Research website (www.research.com) 
 Bloomberg (www.bloomberg.com) 
 
2.5 Summary  
 
This section has discussed some of the relevant literature for this study and the various 
limitations. Some of the topics written by these authors would be quoted in the subsequent 
chapters. 
 
The next chapter would focus on the basics knowledge on REITs. 
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Chapter 3  Investment Vehicle - REIT 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
Basically, the catalyst or drivers for REITs stemmed from its benefits for the sponsors and 
investors. Besides the advantages of REIT, the risks, the aspects of good management, 
financial ratios and the relevant market indices are discussed in the following sections. 
 
3.2 Investor’s Perspectives 
 
Regular and stable cash distributions. REITs have a fairly reliable income stream from 
rental collections paid by tenants bounded by lease agreements with specific durations. 
Hence, REITs income level is highly predictable. Rents collected from tenants are 
distributed to investors on a regular basis in the form of cash distributions. This underpins 
the relatively regular and stable cash distributions that REITs provides unit holders.  
 
Diversified alternative to direct real estate investment. Generally, REITs own multi-
property portfolios with a diversified tenant pool, hence reducing the risks of reliance on a 
single property and tenant in the case of directly owning a real estate. This provide the 
average individual investor with the opportunity to invest in a relatively diversified pool of 
real estate assets (rather than individually investing in a specific property) for a modest 
investment amount.  
 
Liquid alternative to direct real estate investment. With listed REITs, investors can transact 
units of REITs through the stock exchanges at current market prices. As liquid 
investments with instantaneous pricing, it also allows investors the flexibility to quickly 
adjust their exposure to real assets with ease and at a low cost, as compared to chunky 
properties.  
 
Capital appreciation potential.  REITs provide ongoing distributions along with the potential 
for long-term capital gains through share price appreciation due to increased value of 
underlying assets and hence the investment value.  
 
Risk diversification and defensive investment. Apparently, REITs are popular with 
investors who view stocks as too risky; bonds as not giving enough yield and interest rates 
are low. REITs complement other types of investments by offering a defensive position in 
the volatile equity market. As an investment product characterised by high dividend yield 
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with the prospect for long-term capital growth, it plays a significant role in risk 
diversification from a portfolio context. (Ooi 2006) 
 
Professional Management. REITs allow investors the opportunity to buy into properties 
managed by professional property management companies. It saves them the hassle of 
dealing with the contractual matters and the daily operations.  
 
3.3 Property Owners’ Perspectives 
 
Optimise capital allocation. REITs enabled property owners to monetise illiquid real estate 
assets and reduced their leverage levels. In turn the proceeds could be redeployed 
towards value accretive investments or even redeem equity like in the case of 3 S-REITs, 
CCT, Ascott and K-REIT.  
 
Exit vehicle for private funds or big corporations. Entities with non-core real estate assets 
have another avenue, if not a better one, to divest these bulky assets. Since these assets 
command high prices, the number of institutional buyers with substantial funds is not 
always readily available. REITs with the means of pooling several institutional buyers and 
many retail investors would be able to raise the required funds to acquire the assets. 
Unlike outright sale, the REIT structure allows sponsors to retain control of the properties 
as unit holders and manager.    
 
Alternative source of funding. Another catalyst for introduction of REITs, was the urge to 
find alternative sources of funding to supplement the traditional source of banking 
financing. This was particularly so in the 1990’s, when Singapore’s real estate owners 
experienced the tight credit market and was pressured to consider innovative ways to 
refinance maturing real estate loans (Ooi 2006). With the introduction of REITs, it opens 
up a new source of funding for the capital-intensive real estate sector. 
 
Create an acquisition vehicle. When the REITs share prices are traded at premiums to 
NAV, real estate-intensive organizations find it advantageous to raise equity by 
transferring their real estate holdings into the REIT structures. Besides deriving a better 
valuation for their stocks, they can also raise equity at a lower cost through REIT issues. 
Moreover, REITs enjoy tax benefits. 
 
Improve return on assets. When sponsors transfer their assets to REITs, it enhances the 
efficiency by reducing the asset base while building fee based business to replace rental 
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income. Additionally, it boosts their bottom line when the paper gains are realized. When 
the sponsors scale down their balance sheet, the capital locked in the investment assets 
could be redeploy into high service content businesses. Consequently, the facility 
management staffs are also re-engaged in a more efficient business set-up.   
 
Create fee based income. When the sponsors set up fund or property management 
companies to run the REITs, the fee based revenue streamed from the management 
agreements with the REITs and from the properties deals.  
 
3.4 Risks in REITs Investment 
 
Though REITs has several advantages, unit holders are subjected to similar risks as 
holders of other diversified asset portfolios. Some of the factors which affect returns on 
REITs would be discussed below.  
 
Rise or fall in rental income and property prices arising from a change in market conditions 
and economic factors. As REITs are intended to be invested primarily in real estate 
assets, a decline in the general level of real property prices could adversely affect the 
value of a REIT, by way of the revised net asset value (RNAV). The overall depth and 
liquidity of the real estate market and other assets in which REITs are invested may 
fluctuate, which could correspondingly affect the depth and liquidity of trading in REITs.  
 
During bouts of economic slowdown, the property markets would also be adversely 
affected. In a depressed property market, REITs would be hit by falling rental income and 
resulting a drop in property value. Tenants might have difficulty paying rent during these 
hard times because of poor business takings. Hence the lower demand increases the 
vacancy rate and the pressure to reduce rental. Consequently, the income generated from 
such decreases would shrink the dividend payout to unit holders. 
 
Real estate market condition, increased competition (supply) or reduced demand in the 
real estate market. In the next 2 years, some analysts expect that Singapore would have a 
glut in office space when the new buildings are completed. Therefore, the older building 
owners would have to offer competitive rentals to retain their tenants. As such, the ratings 
of some commercial S-REITs, specifically those with older office towers, are lowered, in 
view of tenants preferring modern facilities and possibly moving out. Consequently, these 
REITs’ share prices would also be affected because of the lower ratings. 
 
In situations that reduce the demand of office space, e.g. more people working from home, 
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would also exert pressure on landlords to lower rentals to retain their tenants or 
experienced higher vacancy, causing a reduction of income and dividend distribution.  
 
Investors should examine where the REITs’ properties are located. A high concentration of 
development in one community or geographic region might leave it vulnerable to a 
downturn in that area’s economy. For example, CRT an S-REIT with properties in several 
cities in China, would have the advantage of diversified geographical risk. 
 
Wear and tear, and disasters which damage physical real estate assets owned by the 
REITs. When a building and its facilities are being used, wear and tear occurs over the 
years. As time passes by, more regular maintenance and repairs would be necessary to 
keep the facilities in working condition, therefore costs would increase and decrease the 
dividend payout.  
 
Recently there were 2 floods along Singapore’s prime shopping belt, Orchard Road, some 
buildings’ basement were not spared. These below ground retail outlets’ goods and 
restaurants’ equipments were damaged by the water gushing into the building. Without 
doubt, these retailers’ and restaurants’ income were affected. Accordingly they would 
request the manager to bear some of the costs or ask for rental concessions and to retrofit 
the building to prevent such occurrence. As a result, the rental income reduces and the 
maintenance expenses would increase, thus the dividends to the unit would be lower. 
 
Substantial changes in interest rates, affecting listed REITs attractiveness as an 
investment instrument. As 90% of the taxable income is distributed to unit holders, not 
much cash would be retained for future expansions or acquisitions. Thus, other than 
raising equity, REITs would have to rely on loans for growth mandates. Any rise in interest 
rates would increase the interest costs payable to banks and decrease dividend payouts. 
 
Another related issue is the leverage levels. If it is high, the interest cost would 
correspondingly be high and the net income would be more sensitive to changes in 
interest rates. 
 
The other concern if interest rates increase unexpectedly and higher than the yields 
offered by REITs, investors would sell it off and go for other investments offering better 
returns and depressing the REIT share prices. 
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Professionalism and experience affecting the performance of the property management 
firm. A REIT manager with a good track record, professional and experienced staffs would 
be more efficient in the daily operations and better at making investments decisions. In the 
long run, this would keep the maintenance cost down and improve the REIT’s investment 
value. 
 
In effect, the strength of a REIT is largely dependent on the integrity and the shrewdness 
of its managers. These virtues are necessary for making the best of the inherent value of 
the REIT’s properties. That is why; bad management is a very great risk for a REIT. Bad 
or constantly changing management possibly lead to poor growth potential if any. 
 
Without a sense of moral obligation and fiduciary to the unit holders, a REIT manager 
might ramp up the portfolio size indiscriminately without any regard for quality and 
sustainable value of its assets. This agency problem is even more susceptible if the trust 
manager is paid on a percentage of the value of the portfolio it manages, and size of 
acquisitions it makes. For instance, an incompetent or irresponsible manager could 
conspire with financially troubled vendors. As the latter needs cash and the manager 
needs more properties so as to earn more fees. The manager make the acquisition at a 
highly inflated price, and the seller agrees to lease back the space, also at above market 
rental rates. Seemingly, an accretive yield is technically met. Both the manager and seller 
walk away as happy ‘winners‘, at the expense of the unit holders.    
 
Quality and location of assets owned by the REITs, essentially affecting sustainability and 
stability of revenues. Different location and quality of property would entice different profile 
of tenants. For example, in the suburban locations, the catchments would be the 
neighbouring residents. Modern malls with tenant mix that carter to the people’s daily 
needs would continue to be popular and in turn it would attract anchor tenants such as 
super markets and pharmacies. Therefore the property would generate stable rental 
incomes and the REIT would be able to sustain its dividend distributions. In times when 
tourism is affected, REITs such as CMT and Frasers CT with suburban malls, patronage 
and income level would be less affected as compared to Starhill Gbl and SuntecREIT with 
malls in the tourist belts. 
 
Government and public policy or any laws and taxation changes relating to REITs or 
property sector would have an impact on returns on REITs. To illustrate, if the stamp duty 
waiver for transferring properties from the sponsor to the REIT is withdrew, these would 
increase the expenses and reduce the amount of income available for dividend. 
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Cross border REITs. REITs participating in properties or investments outside Singapore 
would be subjected to the risks of fluctuations in currency values, differences in generally 
accepted accounting principles, or local economic or political events in the countries in 
which those properties or investments are located. 
 
Dilution effect from deferring of new issues of units to a future date when buying new 
properties from sponsors. When purchasing properties, REITs would probably have to 
finance part of the acquisition by raising equity. With more units, it would mean that there 
will be a dilutive effect, which is a lower yield per unit. As such, to entice the investors with 
a higher yield in the first years, the REIT manager would issue the new units to the 
sponsor at a later date. 
 
Any other factors affecting returns of the underlying assets. 
 
Those circumstances that affect the overall performance or expected performance of the 
real estate market and other related industries, would affect the tenants’ businesses, 
income and their ability to pay rentals. These general economic climate and outlook would 
influence the investors’ expectation. With anticipation of lower dividend yield, investors 
would also lessen the share price that they would pay for these REITs. 
 
To sum up, returns of REITs, with different types of assets, would be affected by different 
business market cycle. There is no one REIT that would be ‘all weather proof’ or forever 
blue chip. Hence, investors must be aware of the type of underlying property, its tenants’ 
business market cycle, the growth potential, the financial status, the track record of its 
managers and sponsors, to make insightful investment decisions. 
 
3.5  Quality of Good Management 
 
Since a good management is central to the appeal of a REIT, this section would examine 
the issues in this aspect. 
 
Firstly, the management should be forward looking and clearly defining the growth 
strategies. In terms of growth, it can be organic or dynamic. Organic growth refers to non-
acquisition approach. One way is through asset enhancement, facilities refurbishments, 
expanding the existing premises, updating the design and layout to increase the 
pedestrian flows for retail mails so as to retain and attract valuable tenants. Another is to 
actively improving revenue via turnover leases, step-up rents or increased non-rental 
income, in other words pro-active asset management. 
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The dynamic growth strategy is by means of yield accretive acquisitions. Specifically 
referring to steady stream of acquisition pipelines fed by sponsors and the first right of 
refusal given to sponsoring REITs. This in turn benefits the sponsors’ asset management 
arms with fee-based incomes. 
 
Secondly, the management should be pro-active in anticipating the potential problems, 
accelerating the required measures and accentuating its service quality. For example, in 
2009 CCT expected that rents would soften, so the management engaged tenants to 
renew their leases early. The intent was to lock in rental income and maintain a high 
occupancy rate. As a result, it helped to maintain a well-spread lease expiry profile so 
there is no lumpiness in any given year and moderate rent declines if any. 
 
It should continue to align tenancy mix with market trends, enhancing the shoppers’ 
experience to attract repeat customers and retain or increased pedestrian flows. Efforts 
should be made in formulating strategies and initiatives to deliver higher returns in good 
times or maintain income in bad times. This involves setting optimal rental and expenses 
benchmarks at each building, by reviewing tenants and space usage to optimise income, 
managing rental arrears to minimise bad debts, monitoring expenses to maximise net 
income. These would address the key operational issues to ensure alignment with the 
stable and growing income strategies. (Sing 2007) 
 
3.6 Relationship between Sponsor, Manager and Unit holders 
 
One of the S-REIT headline news in late 2009, involving MacarthurCook Industrial REIT 
(MI, rename AIMS) and Cambridge Industrial Trust, saw MI being recapitalised, despite 
feisty opposition from minority unit holders. This event highlighted some potential agency 
problems in the existing S-REITs. 
 
In other corporate entities, the control and economic decision-making lies in the hands of 
the shareholder with the controlling stake. However for REITs, the external manager is the 
one who makes the investment decisions and controls the distribution of its cash flow, as 
spelled out in the trust deed as well as the REIT guidelines. Explicitly, when unit holders 
buy into REITs, they own the assets not the manager.  
 
Therefore, one could gain a controlling block of shares in a REIT but have no control over 
the REIT’s underlying investment strategies, which is vested with the manager. To 
illustrate the influence of a manager over the REIT’s business, the manager gets to 
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recommend what assets the REIT buys and the terms of purchase. These include the 
price, timing and whether to buy from the REIT’s sponsor, which usually owns the 
manager. This implies that whoever controls the manager, also control the REIT. Hence, 
to take control over a REIT, a potential investor is willing to pay a premium for the 
controlling stake in the manager rather than for the units in the REIT. For that reason, unit 
holders are deprived of a valuable offer. The REIT manager gains at the expense of the 
unit holders. 
 
There is a need for the authorities to examine whether the transfer of ownership in the 
REIT manager is tantamount to passing the control of the REIT. The current interpretation 
of takeover guidelines for a REIT - defined as gaining control of at least 30% ownership of 
the REIT but without any reference to the manager. This is open to exploitation by 
incoming investors looking for a cheap alternative to control a REIT and the manager, who 
would be rewarded instead of the unit holders. 
 
With regards to the above issues, OCBC Investment research has also made some 
recommendations. 
 
Increased alignment of incentives. Presently, most managers are earning fees based on 
asset value and on net property income (NPI). In the recent past, S-REITs have relied 
mainly on acquisitions to grow both NPI and portfolio size, hence the manger also earns 
commission fees from the acquisitions. Depending on the price and financing structure, 
these 2 metrics could be increased with no real benefits to unit holder. A suggested 
solution is to peg part of the manager’s fees to total unit holder return. 
 
More transparency of relationship with sponsor. Typically the S-REIT sector had a bias 
towards developer-sponsor REITs. These captive REITs are inextricably tied to their 
sponsors on a few levels including property management, REIT management and 
acquisitions pipelines. In the current de-leveraging context, there would be sponsors 
selling their assets to their REITs. These pipelines could be a competitive advantage; 
ultimately the investors might be buying access to quality assets. However, price and 
strategic benefit to the REIT would always be a concern. There is a need to improve the 
transparency of acquisition decision-making process that goes beyond a comparison of 
the acquisition cost versus the independent valuation of the target property. 
   
Renewed focus on value accretion. As the market improves, REITs would return to their 
growth-via-acquisition strategy. It was mainly focused on yield accretion, which might be 
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just a function of the amount of leverage required. Therefore, more attention on the value-
add of the acquisition is necessary, whether third party or pipeline-driven. The market 
need to be inquisitive about the purpose of acquisition, the enhancement on the portfolio, 
the strategic considerations behind the decision and the benefit of un-leveraged 
purchases. 
 
3.7 Market Indices in Singapore 
 
When analysing shares or REITs performance, benchmarks are the basic tools. Locally, 
the Strait Times Index (STI) and FTSE ST Real Estate Index are the key indices to check 
on when looking at the returns of the shares. 
 
The STI is the internationally recognised benchmark index and barometer for Singapore‘s 
shares performance. It tracks the top 30 companies listed on the SGX ranked by market 
capitalisation, that pass the investability screens. The FTSE ST Real Estate Index was 
launched in 2008. It is further split into FTSE Real Estate Investment & Service Index and 
FTSE ST Real Estate Investment Trusts (FTSE REIT) Index to cater to investors in 
different segments of Singapore‘s real estate market. 
 
Figure 3.1 : FTSE ST Real Estate Index Sector Breakdown 
  
 
Amongst the top 10 constituents of the FTSE Real Estate Index, 5 are S-REITs. In terms 
of market capitalisation, the S-REIT constitutes 34.41% in the index. The largest 
constituent of the index is CapitaLand, a major sponsor of S-REITs, with 3 under its wings. 
2 of these, CMT and CCT are also amongst the top 10 constituents. 
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Table 3.1 : FTSE ST Real Estate Index Top 10 Constituents 
Rank Constituents Net Market 
Cap (SGD m) 
Index 
Weight (%) 
  
1 CapitaLand 12,589 20.76 
  
2 Hong Kong Land 11,973 19.74 
  
3 CapitaMall Trust 4,190 6.91 
  
4 Ascendas Real Estate Investment Trust 3,590 5.92 
  
5 CapitaMalls Asia 3,511 5.79 
  
6 Keppel Land 2,622 4.32 
  
7 Suntec Reit 2,408 3.97 
  
8 UOL Group 2,315 3.82 
  
9 CapitaCommercial Trust 2,257 3.72 
  
10 Mapletree Logistics Trust 1,310 2.16 
  
 
Total 46,765 77.11 
  
 
 Source : FTSE Group, data as at 31 March 2010 
 
Table 3.2 : FTSE ST Real Estate Indices Portfolio Characteristics 
 
FTSE ST  
Real Estate 
Index  
FTSE ST Real Estate 
Investment & Services 
Index  
FTSE ST REIT 
Index  
No. of Constituents 37 17 20 
Net Market Cap (SGD m) 60,646 39,779 (65.59%) 20,867 (34.41%) 
Constituents Sizes :(Net Market Cap SGD m) 
    
Average 1,639 2,340 1,043 
Largest 12,589 12,589 4,190 
Smallest 64 64 157 
Median 572 937 505 
Weight of Largest Constituents (%) 20.76 31.65 20.08 
Top 10 Holdings (% Index Market Cap) 77.11 95.27 83.48 
 
 
 Source : FTSE Group, data as at 31 March 2010 
 
3.8  Financial Aspects of REITs 
 
There are a few important financial factors that investors should look out for when deciding 
on a particular REIT. Essentially the fundamental operation of a REIT is that the manager 
of a REIT will take loans or raise cash to buy assets, lease the assets and collect income 
from the assets. Then dividends are profits to be distributed after deducting interest 
charges, management fees and some other fees. Therefore the most important 
consideration for a REIT is its debt profile. A REIT with excessive debt would have interest 
charges that could possibly erode bottom line growth.  
 
Gearing is a measure of how leveraged the REIT is. It is the portion of debt expressed as 
a percentage of its net asset value.  It is advisable to choose a REIT with reasonable level 
of gearing, as some amount of debt in any business can be put to effective use to boost 
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the returns. The level of gearing could be compared against other REITs in the same 
sector. Interest coverage ratio is an important number which measures income collected 
to interest charges. Theoretically, a high interest coverage ratio would offer the entity a 
sufficient buffer should interest charges rise unexpectedly in the future, hence the financial 
stability would not be affected that much. 
 
The debt maturity profile of an investable REIT should have their debt maturity dates 
adequately spread. If the bulk of the loans expire in the same period, and happened 
during the financial crisis, the manager would have a devastating time arranging 
refinancing. Moreover, it is likely that refinancing would be expensive if it is successful. 
 
Apart from the debt profile, dividend yield and discount of price to book value of the REIT 
are some of the considerations in making investment decision.  
 
Dividend yield is the annual current dividend rate for a security expressed as a percentage 
of its share price. It looks at the rate of return of the dividend as compared to the share 
price. A high yield may not always means the REIT is doing well. On the contrary, it could 
indicate that it is a risky investment, and the investors expect a higher return to take on the 
higher risks, thus price the units low. When high yields coincide with escalating property 
prices, it would affect the growth of REITs portfolios. Because this means a difficult 
environment for REITs to raise new equity, even if they have attractive new acquisitions in 
the pipeline. The higher yield in the equity market implies more expensive equity capital 
and this would limit the upside of prices they could pay for in the new acquisitions. 
 
Net Asset Value (NAV) or Book Value for REITs, is the value of real estate in the portfolio 
less off borrowings (debts). By expressing NAV per share, investors can measure the 
degree of premium or discount to NAV at which the share prices is currently being traded. 
A premium could indicate that investors are willing to pay a share price higher than the 
NAV, with the expectation that there is future capital appreciation because of the growth 
prospects of the REIT. 
 
3.9 Summary  
 
When making investments decisions, investors should equip themselves with the 
knowledge of the investment’s characteristics (risks and benefits), quality of management, 
and the appropriate tools to analyse the returns or performance. That is what this chapter 
aimed to highlight. The next chapter is a review of the backdrop of S-REITs. 
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Chapter 4  S-REITs 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The following sections would be the background information about the types of S-REITs, 
its managers and sponsors, the guidelines and the initial developments in the S-REITs 
sector. 
 
4.2 List of S-REITs and the Market Capitalisation 
 
 Table 4.1: Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) listed on SGX 
Name of REIT Date of listing No. of Shares (m) 
Market 
Capitalisation 
(SGD m) 
Price 
(SGD) 
Cache Logistics Trust (Cache) 12 April 2010 632.200 622.717 0.985 
IndiaBulls Properties Investment Trust (IndiaBulls) 11 June 2008 3,619.142 850.498 0.235 
Lippo-Mapletree Indonesia Retail Trust (LMIR) 19 November 2007 1,076.415 
522.061 0.485 
Saizen REIT (Saizen) 9 November 2007 949.194 151.871 0.16 
Parkway Life Real Estate Investment Trust (PLife) 23 August 2007 604.001 869.761 1.44 
Ascendas IndiaTrust (AiT) 1 August 2007 761.893 746.655 0.98 
AIMS AMP CAP Industrial Trust (AIMS) 19 April 2007 1,466.599 322.652 0.22 
First Real Estate Investment Trust (FirstReit) 11 December 2006 275.474 
243.794 0.885 
CapitalRetail China Trust (CRT) 8 December 2006 622.885 784.797 1.26 
Cambridge Industrial Trusts (Cambridge) 25 July 2006 873.218 445.341 0.51 
CDL Hospitality Trusts (CDL HTrust) 19 July 2006 837.695 1,549.736 1.85 
Frasers Centrepoint Trusts (FrasersCT) 5 July 2006 764.198 1,062.235 1.39 
K-REIT Asia (K-REIT) 28 April 2006 1,336.023 1,629.948 1.22 
Ascott Residence Trust (Ascott) 31 March 2006 617.320 728.438 1.18 
Frasers Commercial Trust (FrasersComm) 30 March 2006 3,052.988 427.418 0.14 
Starhill Global REIT (Starhill Gbl) 20 September 2005 1,935.335 
1,122.494 0.58 
Mapletree Logistics Trust  (MapleLog) 28 July 2005 2,054.315 1,756.439 0.855 
Suntec Real Estate Investment Trust (SuntecReit) 9 December 2004 1,870.378 2,618.529 1.40 
CapitaCommercial Trust (CCT) 11 May 2004 2,813.915 3,714.368 1.32 
Fortune Real Estate Investment Trust HKD  
(Fortune Reit) 12 August 2003 1,661.595 1,040.540 3.54 
Ascendas Real Estate Investment Trust (AREIT) 19 November 2002 1,871.154 
3,742.308 2.00 
CapitaMall Trust (CMT) 17 July 2002 3,180.193 6,264.980 1.97 
 
  Source: SGX, Shares Investment 
  Data as at 16 July 2010 
 
Currently there are 22 S-REITs listed on the SGX with a total capitalisation of more than 
SGD 31 billion. The first 2 S-REITs’ IPO was in 2002 and the most numbers listed was in 
2006 before the financial crisis. There was only 1 S-REIT, IndiaBull, the first Indian REIT, 
who braved the economic adversity in 2008. Its subdued performance discourages several 
prospective REIT IPOs, especially those from India. The latest IPO by Cache, is after 
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about 2 years when the market sentiments are more optimistic. The table 4.1 shows the 
details. 
 
4.3  S-REIT Typical Structure 
 
The diagram below shows the typical structure of an S-REIT. 
 
Figure 4.1: S-REIT Typical Structure 
 
Source: SGX 
 
The investors (unit holders) would invest their funds into the REIT. With the capital 
collected from the investors, the REIT would purchase properties and distribute the net 
rental income back to the unit holders in proportion to their investment amount.  
 
The trustee represents the interest of the unit holders in ensuring that their properties are 
managed accordingly and they receive their dividends regularly. The asset manager is in 
charge of the portfolio and the investment strategies. On the other side, the property 
manager take cares of the properties maintenance and daily operations. 
 
4.4 MAS Guidelines 
 
A REIT can be considered a passive investment instrument introduced and regulated as 
Collective Investment Schemes under the Securities and Futures Act in 2002. It is 
basically a hybrid product which combines the profile of a listed issuer and the activities of 
a fund, investing effectively in properties with the aim to provide returns derived from 
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rental income. 
 
A dual-responsible model is applied to REIT; the roles of the Trustee and Manager are 
separated, since the responsibilities of both parties can be clearly set out. The Manager is 
a separate company usually created by the property company or sponsor, for the specific 
purposes of managing and administering the REIT and execution of investment mandates. 
Whereas the Trustee must be a public company, is responsible for safeguarding the rights 
and interests of unit holders. One popular trustee in Singapore is HSBC Institutional Trust 
Services (Singapore) Limited (formerly known as Bermuda Trust (Singapore) Limited). It is 
a leading provider of trustee, custodian, accounting and valuation services to the local unit 
trust and REIT industry. 
 
MAS issued the eagerly awaited set of regulatory guidelines for setting up property funds 
in Singapore on 14 May 1999. The objective behind the introduction of property funds is to 
widen the range of financial products available to investors, consistent with efforts to make 
Singapore a world-class financial center. In many ways, the property fund is similar to the 
REIT in the U.S.  
 
The property fund cannot be involved in property development, whether on its own or in a 
joint venture or by investing in unlisted property development firms. As MAS explains, this 
is because property development carries a higher risk and is also due to the fact that 
property fund is a new type of collective investment scheme in Singapore then. Besides, 
the restriction on property development activities should not hinder the ability of the fund 
manager to manage and invest the property fund.  
 
Real estate can be held through direct ownership of property located in or out of 
Singapore or through shares in an unlisted property investment company. Real-estate-
related assets can be debt securities, listed shares of property companies, mortgage-
backed securities, other property funds, and incidental assets. The remaining portion of 
investments includes government or statutory board securities, debt securities, shares in 
non-property companies, cash, and near-cash items.  
 
The guidelines also state that the property fund cannot invest in vacant land except in 
property to be built on approved vacant land. Investments in uncompleted non-residential 
property are restricted to not more than 10% of the asset value, in Singapore or 
uncompleted property development outside of Singapore. The property fund also cannot 
invest more than 5% in uncompleted property development of a single developer. Another 
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restriction is that it cannot invest more than 5% in any one issuer's securities or any one 
manager's fund.  
 
Besides that, S-REIT is subject to borrowings limits and operational restrictions. The 
borrowing limit is 60% for rated S-REITs and 35% for non-rated ones.  In order to enjoy 
tax transparency status it must pay out 90% of the taxable income as dividends to unit 
holders. This is also extended to include Singapore permanent residents who are tax 
residents in Singapore and other non-corporate Singapore constituted or registered 
entities. In addition, one-third of the Board of Directors must consist of independent 
directors to ensure a level of corporate governance. 
 
4.5  Tax Incentives 
 
For income distribution by REITs that are granted “tax transparent” status by the Inland 
Revenue Authority of Singapore (IRAS), eligible unit holders would receive the dividends 
without having tax deducted at source, for which they subsequently pay income tax at their 
applicable individual or corporate tax rate. Specific tax treatment and eligibility criteria 
would be discussed in the prospectus. (SGX) 
 
Stamp duty remission up to a period of 5 years on properties sold to REITs is an added 
incentive announced in the 2005 Budget (extended till 31 March 2015) that enhances 
competitiveness of REITs in their acquisition drives. If the stamp duty savings of nearly 3% 
of sale price were shared and/or reverted back to property owners, it would help sweeten 
prices offered by REITs assuming that investment yields remain unchanged. This will have 
significant impact on the price discovery process in commercial and industry property 
market. On the other hand, professional valuers will face more uncertainty and are 
required to exercise more judgment in differentiating open market values from investment 
values. (Sing 2005) 
 
The stamp duty waiver coupled with tax transparency make REITs a more efficient vehicle 
vis-à-vis other less efficient tax corporate vehicles in holding real estate assets. Would 
more real estate listed companies with substantial holdings continue to divest real estate 
through REITs in the future? The expected rate of returns for divesting real estate assets 
would likely be one of the key economic considerations of firms that are in the fringe of 
putting their assets into REITs.  
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4.6  Profile of S-REITs’ Manager and Share Holders 
 
Table 4.2 : S-REITs’ Asset Type, Manager and Major Shareholders 
S-REIT Asset Type Manager Major Shareholder 
AREIT Industrial Ascendas Funds 
Managementt (S) Ltd 
Ascendas (JTC) 20%, Citibank Nominees 15%, 
DBS Nominees 15%, HSBC Nominees 12.5% 
AIMS Industrial 
(Singapore & 
Asia) 
AMS AMP Capital Industrial 
Reit Management Ltd 
AMP 16.7%, Citibank Nominees 21.52%, BNP 
Paribus 9.53%, HSBC Nominees 9.38 % 
Ascott Service 
Apartments 
(Regional) 
Ascott Residence Trust 
Management Ltd 
CapitaLand (Temasek) 48.3% 
Cambridge Industrial Cambridge Industrial Trust 
Manangement Ltd 
Mackenzie 6.34%,Citibank Nominees 20.01%, 
DBS Nominees 15.3% 
CRT Malls (China) CapitaRetail China Trust 
Management Ltd 
CapitaLand (Temasek) 40.88%, HSBC 
Nominees 25.27%, Retail Crown 19.73%, 
Citibank Nominees 18.17% 
CCT Office CapitaCommercial Trust 
Management Ltd 
CapitaLand (Temasek) 31.97%, Citibank 
Nominees 15.7% 
CDL HTrust Hotels (Regional) M&C Reit Management  Ltd Hong Leong 40.57%, Citibank Nominees 19.2%, 
HSBC Nominees 9.8% 
Cache Industrial 
(Logistic) 
ARA-CWT Trust 
Management Ltd 
C&P 14.1%, JF Asset Management 6.5% 
CMT Malls CapitaMall Trust 
Management Ltd 
Capital Mall Asia (Temasek) 29.8%, Citibank 
Nominees 20.32%, NTUC 5.5%, Capital Group 
9% 
FirstReit Healthcare (Asia) Bow Sprit Capital 
Corporation Ltd 
OCBC Nominees 20.27%, Amfraser Securities 
12.84%, DBS Nominees 9.43% 
Fortune Reit Malls (Hongkong) ARA Asset Management (Fortune) Ltd 
Cheng Kong 32%, Temasek 6.02%,Schroder 
10.95%, Citibank Nominees 9.99% 
FrasersCT Malls (Singapore 
& overseas) 
Fraser Centrepoint Asset 
Management Ltd 
Frasers Centrepoint Ltd 51.93%, AIG 5.94%, 
Capital Group 7.45% 
FrasersCom Malls & Office Fraser Centrepoint Asset 
(Commercial) Management 
Ltd 
F&N 23%, FCL Trusting Holdings 16.6% 
K-REIT Office (Pan-Asian) K-REIT Asia Management 
Ltd 
Keppel Corp (Temasek) 30.4%, Keppel Land 
(Temasek) 45.4 
LMIR Malls (Indonesia) Lippo-Mapppletree 
Indonesia Trust 
Management Ltd 
Citibank Nominees 31.77%, HSBC Nominees 
11.64%, DBS Nominees 15.68%, Pamphleteer 
(Temasek) 11.82% 
MapleLog Industrial 
(Logistic, Asia) 
Mapppletree Logistics Trust 
Management Ltd 
Mapppletree Investment (Temasek) 44.3%, 
Citibank Nominees 18.03%, HSBC Nominees 
11.19% 
PLife Healthcare  Parkway Trust Management 
Ltd 
Parkway 35.31%, Citibank Nominees 24.86%, 
HSBC Nominees 8.44% 
Saizen Residential 
(Japan) 
Japan Residential Assets 
Manager Ltd 
ASM (V-Nee Yeh) 13.26%, HSBC Nominees 
34.47%, Citibank Nominees 9.42%, Raffles 9.18 
Starhill Gbl Malls & Office 
(APAC) 
YTL Starhill Global REIT 
Management Ltd 
YTL 29.09%, AIA 11.27%, HSBC Nominees 
37.81%, Citibank Nominees 17.26%, DBS 
Nominees 8.41% 
SuntecReit Malls & Office  ARA Trust Management (Suntec) Ltd 
Asean Inv 5.4%, Shaw 5.8%, Citibank Nominees 
25.81%, HSBC Nominees 13% 
AiT Business Parks (India) 
Ascendas Property Fund 
Trustee Pte Ltd 
Ascendas Land International (JTC) 24.04%, 
Citibank Nominees 15.37%, Capital Group 
10.76% 
IndiaBulls Office (India) 
Indiabulls Property 
Management Trustee Pte 
Ltd 
Raffles Nominees 47.13%, Grapene 33.97%, 
HSBC Nominees 10.97%, FIM 39.8%, Ariston 
11% 
 
 
Source: Annual Reports 
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The leading manager and sponsor is CapitaLand with 3 S-REITs (CMT, CCT and CRT) 
under its wings. The combined total market capitalization of these 3 S-REITs is more than 
SGD 10 billion. CCT holds local office properties and a 30% stake in Quill Capita Trust in 
Malaysia. 
 
Another major REIT player in Singapore is the Hong Kong-based Cheung Kong 
(Holdings), which also manages 3 S-REITs, namely Fortune, Suntec and Cache. Fortune 
REIT has a dual listing, listed in Singapore first then in Hong Kong. It is the first cross 
border REIT in Asia with its investment portfolio comprising retail malls in Hong Kong. 
 
Temasek, Singapore’s Investment Holding Company, is the major investor in S-REITs. It 
owns shares, directly and indirectly via its subsidiaries, in 12 out of the 22 S-REITs. Major 
managers and sponsors such as CapitaLand, Ascendas, Keppel Land and Mapletree are 
also government link corporations. In other words, the players in the S-REIT market are 
dominated by the Singapore sovereign investor. Thereby Temasek plays a vital role in the 
vibrancy of the S-REIT market. 
 
Currently, there is 1 stapled security in the list of S-REIT. That is CDL HTrust, which 
consists of CDL Hospitality REIT and CDL Hospitality Business Trust. Another observation 
is that there are more than half of the S-REITs listed on SGX, 15 are cross borders. 
Though there are only 22 S-REITs, there is some variety for investors to choose from. The 
following Table 4.2 is the breakdown of S-REITs details. 
 
4.7 Ownership and Management of S-REITs 
 
In the U.S., REITs must meet stringent ownership tests to mitigate potential conflict 
interests between sponsors and unit holders of REITs. REIT units must be distributed to at 
least 100 different shareholders, and 50% of the REIT units cannot be concentrated in 5 
major shareholders (known as 5/50 rule). Ownership restrictions are also imposed on 
Japanese REITs (J-REITs): the largest three J-REIT unit holders must not own more than 
50% of the J-REIT units, and the largest ten unit holders must not own more than 75% of 
J-REIT units, and J-REIT units must be distributed to at least 1000 investors.  
 
Locally, the S-REIT sponsors usually retained considerable control of S-REIT shares after 
IPOs, and an independent asset management subsidiary is also set up by sponsors to 
render fee-based management services to REITs. These REITs are known as captive 
REITs. In the U.S., the close relationship between sponsors and management companies 
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in captive REITs creates potential sources of agency problems, which include over-paying 
properties unloaded by sponsors. Given the high agency costs associated with captive 
REITs, they were found to have significantly underperformed non-captive REITs. (Sing 
2005)  
 
In Singapore, regulatory restraints and market mechanisms have been in placed to instil 
financial discipline and mitigate potential conflict of interests in S-REITs. Such measures 
include disclosure of self-dealing with sponsors, independent boards of directors, prudent 
and yield-accretive acquisition strategies, 35% borrowing cap, and independent valuation. 
The controlling stake of sponsors in S-REITs itself can be construed as a positive signal 
on the part of sponsors to act in good faith so as to preserve their reputation, and at the 
same time, reduce their financial risks in S-REITs. The influence of institutional investors 
via large holdings of S-REITs units would also serve as a practical supervision on REIT 
managers’ performance. These measures have been fairly effective locally up to now. 
 
S-REITs adopt an externally managed/advised model, where a third party asset manager 
is appointed to provide professional asset management service. The model is prevalent 
for Australia’s Listed Property Trusts (LPT) and many U.S. REITs listed in 1970s and 80s. 
The Tax Reform Act in 1986 in the US facilitates the creation of more internally managed 
REITs in the 1990s that are less susceptible to agency problems. Empirical evidence in 
the US showed that externally advised REITs consistently used more debt than internally 
advised REITs, which caused the under-performance of externally advised REITs. In 
Australia, stapling of LPT and sponsors/parent companies has become a popular mean of 
internalizing the management structure of LPTs. (Sing 2005)  
 
Externally managed structure is more prone to agency problem. For a third party manager 
that manages multiple REITs, it will be more pressing to maintain a high level of 
transparency and independency. Examples of potential agency conflicts that are 
detrimental to long-term value of REITs include collusion between a trust manager and a 
vendor in a sell and leaseback arrangement that deliberately inflates asset prices and 
lease-back rents. Ms Ho Ching, the executive director and CEO of Temasek Holdings, in a 
dinner marking the successful listing of Mapletree Logistic Trust had cautioned that 
“irresponsible” and “incompetent” trust managers could be a source of management risks 
for REIT investors. The MAS had undertaken a review of regulatory framework on REITs 
in June 2005 that aimed to strengthen oversight of REIT managers, and improved the 
corporate governance practice and alignment of interests between REIT manager and unit 
holders. The new guidelines include licensing of REIT managers, more disclosure of 
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acquisition and divestment fees payable to REIT managers, and obtaining two 
independent valuations in the acquisition of properties from interested party.  
 
4.8 Impetus for S-REITs’ Creation 
 
In Singapore, the development of REITs is mainly driven by private sector’s initiatives 
(Sing 2005). At the outset, developers are motivated to divest assets into REITs where 
they continue to hold substantial stake and also own the fund management entity (REIT 
manager). 
 
The sponsoring companies take the opportunity to spin-off (sell) their low-yielding income 
producing properties into REITs. This unlocks the property values and thereby reduces the 
financial leverage. This is an asset light business model and at the same time a fees 
based business is created. 
 
4.9 The Initial S-REITs 
 
CapitaLand made the first attempt; it tried to set up the inaugural S-REIT SingMall 
Property Trust (SPT) in November 2001. The intended offering size for SPT was SGD740 
million, of which SGD530 million (71.6%) was to be floated publicly to institutional and 
retail investors. CapitaLand was to take up 28% of the 740 million units issued by SPT at 
offer price of SGD1.  In terms of free float capitalisation of SDG532.8 million, it was ranked 
third among Singapore property stock (after CapitaLand and City Developments). The 
initial offer yield was estimated to be 5.75%. The listing was withdrawn last minute 
because the subscription fell short of the group’s target.  
 
SPT’s 5.75% offer yield was 277 basis point above Singapore long term government bond 
yield of 2.98%. This was an attractive, high-dividend equity alternative in a volatile market 
with low and falling interest rates at that time. It was also comparable to other domestic 
securities, including high dividend-paying equities during the period of offer. (Mei 2002). 
 
It provided pure exposure to retail sector which was not available among other Singapore 
listed property stocks then. This was advantageous to SPT. In addition, all the 3 malls 
reported 100% occupancy levels and 2 of these were suburban malls which enjoyed large 
catchment areas and remained robust despite the economic downturn.  
 
The portfolio was also well diversified, with more than 440 lease agreements. The largest 
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single retail subsector providing base rental income of 21% for SPT, while the 10 largest 
tenants generating 25.6%.  
 
Though SPT had the above positive factors, it had its weaknesses that caused its failure 
to launch. Firstly, its weighted lease term by base rental income was only 2 years and the 
typical rental cycle in Singapore is 3 years. The short asset duration was an unattractive 
trait in a declining rental rate trend (market sentiment then). SPT’s manager was trying to 
negotiate longer lease terms, but to lock tenants in for longer in uncertain time, it would 
need to offer better terms. This would reduce the subsequent dividend payouts and the 
yield in the next year.  
 
Secondly, pricing was unattractive on a total return basis at initial 5.75% yield. Because 
the retail outlook for Singapore was dimmed following September 11. Therefore investors 
were not convinced about SPT’s near term growth potential. 
 
Thirdly, the investors were concerned that the property valuation was high. The 3 malls to 
be bought were revalued at SGD100 million higher than the previous year, when the 
property prices in Singapore were set to decline due to the economic downturn. In 
addition, SPT’s price was at 2.7% premium to an already high Net Asset Value (NAV). 
Thus making investors worried about the downside risks on valuation. 
 
Fourthly, SPT’s manager lack of REIT experience. 2 months before the IPO, Lend Lease 
decided not to be the external manager for SPT and it was doubtful whether CapitaLand 
had enough experience to manage a REIT. 
 
Last but not least, the distribution was skewed towards the institutional investors, and 
emphasized a few large orders from strategic investors. A small portion, it was estimated 
that only 8% of the final order came from retail demand. On hindsight, the marketing 
efforts for this new asset class to domestic retail investors was not enough, thus adversely 
affecting the take up rate of the retail tranche.  
 
Market timing and lack of tax transparency were cited by analysts as the main causes for 
the lukewarm response to this maiden S-REIT (Sing 2005). The poor demand was blamed 
on the insufficient time to educate investors on a new investment vehicle and the 
competing fund raising exercises by major local companies. Basically, REIT was a new 
instrument and investors were apprehensive about the performance after listing, given the 
aforesaid issues. 
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CapitaLand did not give up its effort to set up REITs, knowing the benefits and seeing the 
market potentials for this new asset class. In the following year, 17 July 2002, its efforts 
paid off when CapitaMall Trust (CMT, restructured SPT) was successfully launched. The 
IPO price was SGD0.96 and about SGD710 million was raised. This was estimated at 2% 
discount to NAV compared to the earlier attempt that priced the IPO at 2.7% premium. 
 
The launch of CMT was a success with 5-time oversubscription, and it has been an 
important cornerstone in S-REIT history. All these years, it is also the highest market 
capitalisation S-REIT. Currently, it is worth about SGD6 billion and NAV of SGD5 billion, 
the blue chip of the S-REITs. 
 
Subsequently, Ascendas-REIT (AREIT) was listed on SGX, in November 2002; its IPO 
was also over-subscribed by 5-times. Next was Fortune REIT, the first cross border REIT 
in Asia. 
 
Despite the low yield of office properties, CapitaLand made a break-through in 2004, when 
it successfully launch the first office S-REIT, CCT, through a spin-off, which involved no 
new equity being raised. Basically, shareholders in CapitaLand were given 1 new share in 
CCT for every 5 CapitaLand shares held. 40% of the CCT would be held by CapitaLand, 
while 60% by other shareholders. As the CCT shares were distributed to CapitaLand 
shareholders as part of a capital reduction exercise, the REIT was not subjected to the 
usual risk of under-subscription or under-pricing associated with the typical IPO process. 
The sponsor also did not incur any tax charge or underwriting fees on the CCT spin-off.  
 
This was insightful way to reduce the asset base with the least cost and risks. Besides 
increasing fee income from an expanded real estate fund management platform, the spin-
off also enhanced the sponsor’s capital productivity and improved its rate of return to 
shareholders (Ooi 2006). Following this footsteps were 2 other REITs, Ascott and K-REIT 
which made their IPO in 2006. 
 
4.10  Possible Future S-REITs Developments  
 
It is expected that there would be more cross border REITs from emerging economies 
such as China and India, as their REIT markets are undeveloped and legislations are not 
as conducive as compared to Singapore. The local market’s well developed financial 
infrastructure is able to provide the necessary professionals and international exposure for 
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these REITs. There are market speculations that DLF and Unitech, India's two largest 
listed developers are considering to revive their aborted S-REIT IPOs. These were put on 
hold in 2008 due to the global financial crisis. 
 
The local Shariah REIT is not developed, as compared to our neighbour, Malaysia, but it is 
reported that there is one setting up in Singapore soon. Surrounding countries, such as 
Indonesia, are populated mostly by Muslim, and it is foreseen that there is a demand from 
this group for Syriah compliant investments. Besides, REITs can be converted relatively 
easily to comply with the restrictions in the Islamic doctrines to entice this group of 
investors and those from Middle East. 
 
As a basic tenet, Islamic finance emphasizes that financing activities should underpin real 
commercial activities and interest is forbidden. Due to its widening acceptance and its 
appeal as a means for ethical investment, the industry is expected to continue growing. 
Since Singapore has signed Free Trade Agreements with Middle East, there is going to be 
more economic activities with these regions. S-REIT would provide an opportunity for the 
Arabian investors to park their petroleum money and geographically diversified their 
portfolios. 
 
Singapore may finally be getting its first Shariah-compliant REIT when Mapletree 
Investments lists Mapletree Industrial Trust (MIT) later in 2010. The assets include 39 
blocks of flatted factories and other industrial buildings, warehouses and business parks. 
The Bahrain-based Arcapita Bank would take up a 56.1% stake. Mapletree Investments 
owns 25% of MIT, while the the rest is held by Mapletree Industrial Fund, a fund 
sponsored by Mapletree Investments and Itochu. MIT’s assets are valued at some $1.73 
billion, according to Mapletree Investments’ annual report for the year to March. Mapletree 
Investments is wholly owned by Temasek Holdings.  
 
Mapletree Investments plans to position MIT as a Shariah-compliant REIT even though it 
costs more than operating an ordinary REIT, as it would be able to tap Middle Eastern 
funds for cash.  The IPO size is likely to be between SDG 500 million and SGD 1 billion. 
According to Wong Mun Hong, chief financial officer of Mapletree Investments, if the 
offering is sizeable, it would address the liquidity issue from the start and be included in 
the S-REIT index.  Thus MIT would be an attractive investment.  
 
Some observers believe that MIT will be accorded a premium by the market simply 
because it is sponsored by a Temasek-linked company. S-REITs linked to the likes of 
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Ascendas and CapitaLand were able to lean on their parents for a pipeline of assets 
during the boom and financial support during the bust. 
 
Another development could be stapled securities. Presently, there is one such investment 
locally, CDL Hospitality Trust. It is a combination of a REIT and a business trust 
investment structure. The sponsor enjoys liquidity benefits from the 2 trusts and holds the 
controlling stakes. The sponsor also holds both the property/fund management and the 
hotel operations management arms. These are 2 separate but link business entities. The 
whole setup provides multiple sources of incomes, while liquidity and flexibility are not 
compromised. Being captives REIT, both the interest of the REIT and mangers are more 
aligned. 
 
S-REITs could move into project developments as future accretive acquisitions would be 
limited. Under the MAS REIT Guidelines, investments by S-REITs in uncompleted 
property development activities are subject to a limit of 10% of total assets. This would 
mean that the REITs can undertake development and tenanting properties like a 
developer in a limited way. On the flip side, development project does come with 
development risks. This could be minimized if REITs develop projects on a committed 
basis i.e. tying in the tenants contractually before committing to the development. 
 
Currently, AREIT is the only industrial REIT with development projects. In 2007 the 
industrial REIT market was crowded and the competition to buy growth via acquisition was 
getting more difficult. One way to avoid the price war with other REITs is to develop its 
own properties. Hence AREIT tried to overcome this by focusing on the development 
route. So far AREIT is the only REIT that has pursued this route with some success.  
 
Now MapleLog, Cambridge, and AIMS have also expressed an interest in development 
projects. Development projects carry higher risk but also offer higher returns - they also 
allow the REIT to create its own pipeline for future acquisitions and to cater to specific 
client needs. This is likely more of a medium-term goal because of the difficulty in finding 
the right project and partner. The 10% mandatory limit also requires the REIT to be of 
sufficient scale to make any project viable. AIMS and Cambridge would probably have to 
partner with a developer party (potentially an existing tenant or business partner). (OCBC 
Investment Research 2010) 
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4.10 Summary  
 
The above sections reviewed the backdrop of the S-REITs, its initial and some possible 
future developments. The next chapter would discuss the circumstances the S-REITs 
encountered during the financial crisis. 
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Chapter 5 S-REITs Performance Through the Global Credit Crunch 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the relevant market indices and financial ratios for analysing S-REIT are 
examined. The performance of S-REITs during these difficult times is revealed. 
 
5.2 S-REITs Performance Before Financial Crisis 
 
REITs are intended to be defensive and recession-hedging instrument. Their returns are 
dependent on revenues generated from income producing properties held in the portfolios. 
However, S-REITs were not purely yield driven investments in the initial years, indicated 
by the total returns or robust price appreciation, which surpassed the expectation of 
investors. The first 2 REITs: CMT and A-REIT had grown by more than 200% over the a 
period of 3 years since listing in 2002, despite their projected yields of 7% and 8% 
respectively at the IPO. (Sing 2005) 
 
The growth of the S-REITs market was strong. The monthly growth rate in market 
capitalization for the period August 2002 to first half of 2007 was a commendable 7.69% 
as compared to 1.83% for the FTSE Singapore market index. (Sing 2009) 
 
In 2006 and first half of 2007, S-REITs growth were fuelled by both new REIT listings and 
escalating REIT share prices. The newer REITs were more specialized by asset type 
(healthcare, cross border) and they also adopt more sophisticated structure (business 
trust and stapled). By third quarter in 2007, total market capitalization reached SGD27.68 
billion (USD18.13 billion). The 2 engines of growth then were the supply-side and demand 
side drivers  (Sing 2007), which are discussed below. 
 
Supply-side drivers. Sponsors enjoyed the benefit of liquidity for converting asset from 
private ownership to pubic markets in the REIT structure. After selling the assets in 
exchange for cash and units of the REIT, the sponsor are said to be asset light. As the 
units of the REIT could be sold in the exchange, thus the sponsor can easily sell off some 
units whenever it needs funds. The cash raised from selling the asset to the REIT could be 
used to pay off some loans and improved the sponsor’s credit rating. Consequently, there 
were new sources of revenue when the sponsor set up fund manager to structure the 
REIT. It enabled property companies to move beyond “brick and mortar” to aspects of 
asset warehousing, structuring and asset management (Sing 2007). In other words, 
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sponsors do not have to hold to physical and illiquid assets to earn rental revenue. They 
can receive multiple sources of income, that is dividend from the REIT, management fees 
from structuring and asset management. 
 
Demand-side drivers. There were strong demand from institutional investors, pension 
funds and individuals looking for attractive yield and tax-efficient investments. The REITs 
served as a conduit for these intermediating flows of funds across capital markets. (Sing 
2007) 
 
5.3 S-REITs Turning Point in 2007 
 
Key success factors unravelling. On hindsight, the success of SREITs was due to the 
confluence of a few important factors. This include a mindset change by 
developers/landlords (and corporations) towards the benefits of an asset-light balance 
sheet, an investor-friendly tax framework and a transparent REIT regulatory environment. 
Post the success of the early S-REIT; fragmented ownership pattern and many listed 
corporations’ desire to lighten their balance sheets meant that there were plenty of 
properties available. This coupled with low interest rate environment, encouraged 
acquisitions by the REITs which in turn led to rapid earnings and asset growth. 
 
Victim of own success. However the REIT sector has been the victim of its own success. 
The success of early REITs had encouraged more players into the market, all hoping to 
replicate the same growth strategy. The crowded market space was compounded by other 
new players (mostly private equity and property funds) attracted by the growing Singapore 
market. Collectively the buying spree literally mopped up all the quality properties, 
“bidding” up property valuation in the process and compressing asset yield. Fewer assets, 
together with vendors rising expectation, has in turn led to lower supply of assets available 
for sale, dampening REIT growth. (OCBC Investment Research 2007) 
 
SGD strength to dilute foreign acquisitions. To avoid the competitive domestic market and 
to enjoy higher property yields, some REITs have ventured abroad. In terms of risk-
reward, venturing abroad obviously exposes investors to higher risks; however, the market 
had valued these REITs at a higher premium in early 2007. This implied lower trading 
yields or lower perceived risks. However in light of the Monetary Authority of Singapore’s 
(MAS) intention to accelerate the strengthening of SGD, this diluted the accretive impact 
from foreign asset and its income. This perhaps explains the weaknesses of S-REITs with 
overseas exposure such as CapitaRetailChinaTrust, Mapletree Logistic Trust, and Ascott 
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Residence REIT. To avoid dilution and exposure to forex volatility, when SGD is 
appreciating, Singapore-centric REITs are preferred.  
 
Funding affected by rising cost of capital. In the recent past REITs had been able to buy 
dividend per unit (DPU) accretive assets primarily because of the arbitrage opportunity 
that exists between their cost of capital (as defined by their trading DPU yield) and the 
asset yield (i.e. return from rental income of property). The arbitrage spread was as high 
as 200-300bps, making acquisition highly accretive. However the arbitrage critically 
depended on cheap money or more specifically on high unit prices (which meant fewer 
units needed to be issued to fund the acquisition). However the sub-prime and CDO 
worries in the US have raised the perceived risk in general. Consequently, this led to 
capital market repricing all risks. As for S-REITs, this translates to lower unit prices and 
thus raising its cost of capital (implying more units need to be issued for any acquisitions). 
The costs of capital of some S-REIT in 2007 have risen by 14 to 170 basis points (bps) as 
compared to 2006, or by an average of 96bps. (OCBC Investment Research 2007) 
 
Inflation an issue. Historically, Singapore inflation has been very low; it is between 1% and 
2% mark, and that meant that it was not important in assessing an investment’s financial 
return. However, when inflation was expected to rise to as high as 5% in 2008, financial 
return has to be adjusted accordingly. OCBC Investment Research calculated in 2007, the 
inflation-adjusted return from S-REITs is low, varying from 1.5% to 3.3%.  
 
At this level, the returns did not commensurate for the risks. To compound the situation, 
earnings growth momentum slowed down due to lack of assets to buy and compression of 
arbitrage opportunities (as explained earlier). This could partly explain the S-REITs’ 
weakness in late 2007. 
 
Growth strategy - Acquisition strategy may not work so well. Even though organic and 
asset enhancement (AE) growth can and do provide growth, the pace of growth is a 
function of leases that are up for renewals and an inefficient configuration of existing 
layout. Specifically AE is more applicable to retail sector where changes in layout or tenant 
mix can provide meaningful differences in rental rates. 
 
Generally most assets’ rentals are fairly close to market and properties are fairly well 
designed and utilised in Singapore, hence growth from AE/organic cannot be expected to 
be very exciting. This leaves growth via acquisitions. 
 
 Page 40 
Indeed acquisition growth strategy is the universally adopted strategy by all S-REITs. 
However, this strategy relies critically on two factors; cheap capital and secondly REIT 
managers’ ability to source for properties. In that context S-REITs suffered from a double 
whammy of higher cost of capital and the lack of investible assets in 2007.  
 
In light of this market dynamics, S-REIT managers desperately need a new strategy for 
growth. Some options available include developing its own assets (AREIT), M&A is 
another, or another possible option is to redeem its own units (i.e. unit buy back, need 
permission from SGX). There is also the possibility of unit-holders voting out the manager 
in favour of one who can deliver. Finally if all options are exhausted, REIT managers might 
need to moderate expectations. (OCBC Investment Research 2007) 
 
Sponsor selling to highest bidder. To circumvent the need to compete for properties, some 
REITs tied up with their sponsors/parents to “warehouse properties”. This in turn means 
that these REITs have access to a sustainable supply of properties. Two REITs stand out 
in that respect i.e. MapleLog and Ascott. MapleLog has its parent Mapletree Investment 
sourcing and warehousing industrial properties across the region in anticipation of 
potential future sales to MapleLog. Ascott has The Ascott Group, which in turn has 
regional/ global exposure and an established network, continually sourcing and buying 
service apartments and incubating these assets until they are ready to be offered to 
Ascott. (OCBC Investment Research 2007) 
 
However this strategy could be derailed by an incident in 2007. Specifically it relates to the 
REIT sponsor divesting its assets in favour of a third party. CCT stood out for not buying 
Temasek Tower and Chevron House partially owned by its sponsor CapitaLand. Even 
though no asset yield was released, it is safe to say that the third-party buyer’s offered 
price must had been at a level that was not accretive to CCT. This means that the 
warehousing strategy works if no third party is willing to offer a higher price. When there 
are numerous private property funds and equity funds in the market scouting and eager to 
invest, this scenario cannot be totally ruled out, thereby removing another avenue of 
growth for the REITs. (OCBC Investment Research 2007) 
 
5.4 S-REITs Not Spared from Economic Crisis in 2008 and 2009 
 
The S-REIT sector was not spared by the economic crisis in 2008 and 2009, with the 
FTSE REIT Index falling by 74.8% from its June 2007 peak to its March 2009 trough 
before recovering by 120.8% as at 31 December 2009. However, the index was still 44.4% 
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off from its peak in 2007, as at 31 December 2009. The largest single monthly decline in 
the market capitalization was recorded in October 2008, where 34.67% of the market 
values of S-REITs were wiped out. 
 
 Figure 5.1 : 5 Year Indices Performance Chart 
 
Source: Bloomberg -------STI   -------FTSE REIT   -------FTSE Real Estate Investment & Services 
 
In the first few months of 2009, S-REITs were caught in a vicious cycle of expectations of 
asset value declines that led to refinancing difficulties. The closure of the commercial 
mortgage backed securities market and reluctance of banks to extend financing 
aggravated the predicament further. This drove several S-REITs to seek refinancing 
through private placement or equity fund raising exercises, with CMT leading the way 
forward. Due to substantial recapitalisation activities, the total market capitalisation of S-
REITs surged by 137.7% to SGD29.6 billion in 2009 from SGD12.4 billion in the previous 
year. S-REITs successfully raised an estimated SGD4.8 billion from the equity market, 
mainly through rights issue exercises in 2009. 
 
Market sentiment began to stabilise in March 2009, when governments around the world 
injected liquidity into the banking system and interest rates around the world fell to record 
low. With a rebound in unit prices, the average dividend yield of S-REITs has compressed 
to 6.5% as at 31 December 2009 from 12.0% as at 31 December 2008. This was 
approximately 380 basis points above the Singapore government 10-year bond yield of 
2.7% as at 31 December 2009. 
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In a comparison of annual total returns of Asian REITs, gains in the REIT markets ranged 
from 6.1% in Japan to 82.2% in Singapore in 2009. 
 
In 2009, a limited availability of debt financing and unit price corrections have forced S-
REITs to restrict their previously aggressive asset acquisition agendas and refocus on 
survival and tenant retention in a difficult market. Many S-REITs sponsors have also 
moderated their development pipelines and capital expenditure plans. 
 
Liquidity Crunch and Refinancing Risks  
 
The flight of capital from the stock markets has caused liquidity crunch to S-REITs. Many 
found it difficult to refinance their short-to-medium term loans; hence growth through yield 
accretive acquisitions froze. (Sing 2009) 
 
The amendment in 2005 REIT guidelines, allows S-REIT to increase borrowing limits from 
35% to 60% if its credit rating is at least an “A”. This has induced REITs to optimize 
leverage benefits of debt, meaning that they would use more debt to fund their 
acquisitions as long as the debt costs are lower than total investment returns. The use of 
short-to-medium term loans to finance new investments that would be held over long-term 
horizons causes liquidity mismatches. In particular, when the loan is matured during the 
financial crisis, there would be an ordeal to get the required refinancing. They either have 
to get new loans which are more expensive or face liquidation. The problem would be 
aggravated if rating agencies like Standard & Poors downgrade the REITs credit rating. 
When the REITs could not improve their credit positions, it would be a vicious circle. 
 
In the tight liquidity markets, accessibility to funding, equity or debt, is especially crucial to 
the survival of small REITs with no strong sponsors’ backing. They would be vulnerable 
targets of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) to other REITs or institutional investors. 
 
There were 2 M&A deals in 2008 in Singapore. Allco was acquired by the Frase & Neave 
(F&N) group in July 2008 and renamed Frasers Commercial Trust. Another in October 
2008, Macquire Prime REIT was taken over by a Malaysia conglomerate, YTL Corp, and 
is now listed as Starhill Global REIT. Nevertheless, too high a debt level would put off 
potential buyers as it makes a REIT less attractive. 
 
As a typical pass-through vehicle which distributes at least 90% of its earnings to unit 
holders as dividends, it has limited flexibility in using retained earnings to fund future 
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expansions. Therefore diversification of sources of funds through various suppliers such 
as Commercial Mortgage Back Securities (CMBS), banks as well as equity investors is 
utmost important. However, CMBS markets was shut down at end of 2007 because of the 
sub-prime crisis. So REITs have to negotiate with banks for expensive loans to tide over 
the crisis while waiting for better market conditions or have secondary listings for equity 
funds. During this difficult times, CMT had to raise SGD 1.26 billion by selling right issues 
at a discount of 43.4% to its traded prices of SGD1.45 in 2009 and Saizen had not given 
out dividends to unit holders so to preserve cash. 
 
REITs Not Sure-Win Investments 
 
THE Saizen REIT saga should dispel several widely held myths about the S-REITs – that 
these are no-brainer investments; that they are duty-bound to pay out dividends; and that 
the most consideration when assessing whether a REIT is worth buying into is the 
possible returns from the REIT’s portfolio. 
 
Saizen REIT, which in February 2009 announced that it was not going to pay a distribution 
for second quarter 2009 in order to conserve cash and pay off its loans and it aimed to 
resume payments as soon as possible. But investors have waited till May 2010, when it 
resolved its funding issues, to hear that they can expect to receive dividend for the 
financial year ending 30 June 2010 (“FY2010”), in September 2010 
 
Prior to those announcements, the REIT which gets its income from residential rental 
properties in Japan, put out a proposal that would allow it to pay dividends in the form of 
Reit units – rather than cash – but later said it would not proceed with the plan after 
deliberations with the Singapore Exchange. 
 
Therefore, unit holders had not got any income from their holdings in the REIT for more 
than a year. These investors, who probably bought into the REIT to be ensured of a stable 
source of income, could not have such income until September 2010. 
 
This occurrence reminds all investors that REITs are not required by law to pay out 
dividends. In order to enjoy tax transparency, S-REITs would have to distribute to unit 
holders at least 90 per cent of their distributable income, which means exemption from 
paying corporate tax at the REIT/vehicle level on the portion of income they distribute. 
 
But this tax break only applies to those REITs with assets based in Singapore. REITs such 
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as Saizen, which have all of their properties in Japan, do not qualify for the above-
mentioned tax transparency treatment. This means that they do not have the same 
incentive to pay out 90 per cent of their distributable income as contrary to those REITs 
with all their assets based in Singapore. 
 
Investors here were drawn by the attractive yields reported by the managers before the 
crisis. However, Saizen REIT has proven these yields, are not always guaranteed. 
 
The other thing that this whole saga has highlighted is that when evaluating whether a 
REIT is worth putting your money into, it is not enough to just consider the viability of the 
REIT’s business. One must also look at how the trust initially financed its property 
portfolio. 
 
By all accounts, Saizen REIT’s income stream seemed stable. It has a portfolio of 166 
buildings with 6,000 rental homes in Japan, and held that rents and occupancies across its 
largely mass-market properties have remained stable since the current crisis began. 
 
To some extent, the problem was how those properties were financed when they were 
acquired. When building up its portfolio in the years leading up to its 2007 listing, Saizen 
relied solely on commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) loans to finance its 
purchases. But the CMBS market practically shut down at the beginning of 2008. 
 
The trust had already changed some of its loans to traditional bank loans by then, but the 
crisis meant that bank loans dried up, leaving it with 6 CMBS loans worth some 20.15 
billion yen (SGD303.8 million), which Saizen could not refinance when these were due. 
 
Therefore, it had to draw on cash reserves, proceeds from a $41 million rights issue, 
operating cash flow and a short-term bridging loan to pay off 5 of these CMBS loans worth 
about 12.2 billion yen. 
 
For the sixth CMBS loan, worth 7.95 billion yen, Saizen was looking for refinancing 
through a possible syndicated loan. In the worst-case scenario, if no refinancing could be 
found for the 6th loan, the trust would have to forfeit properties worth 10.3 billion Japanese 
yen, which were used as collateral for that CMBS loan tranche. 
 
High yields and capital gains in the initial years of the sector’s growth have spoilt S-REIT 
investors, or even lulled some into thinking REITs are sure-win investments. The Saizen 
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Saga definitely served as a wake-up call. 
 
Changes in Regulations 
 
To allay market concerns over write-downs in asset values, the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore (MAS) announced in January 2009 that S-REITs would not be considered to 
have breached leverage limits should their aggregate leverage rise due to a decline in 
property values. The MAS also clarified that refinancing of existing debts by a REIT is not 
to be construed as additional borrowings.  
 
The Income Tax Act was amended in 2009 to allow distributions by an S-REIT to be made 
in the form of units of the S-REIT, rather than cash, without affecting the tax transparency 
treatment granted to the S-REIT, subject to certain conditions being met. This concession 
applies only to distributions made during the period from 1 July 2009 to 31 December 
2010. This bestowed S-REITs the flexibility needed in this difficult times, to conserve cash 
to pay off interest expenses or other operation fees or even reduced some overdrafts. It 
also saved those smaller S-REITs with low credit ratings, from force selling their illiquid 
assets at depressed prices when they default. On the contrary, unit holders would be 
short-changed and have to hold on to their underperforming S-REIT investments or to cut 
loss. 
 
The MAS has also introduced a requirement for S-REITs to hold annual general meetings 
(AGMs) once every calendar year, with effect from 1 January 2010. This is intended to 
enhance corporate governance by providing an important channel for communication 
between REIT managers and unit holders. AGMs will provide a regular opportunity for 
REIT managers to engage their unit holders. 
 
In February 2010, the government announced positive Budget measures for the S-REIT 
sector. This included the renewal of income tax, stamp duty and goods and services tax 
concessions till 31 March 2015. The benefits include a concessionary income tax rate of 
10.0% for non-resident non-individual investors, and stamp duty remission on transferring 
a Singapore immovable property to a REIT. 
 
These regulations changes were timely support from the government and gave the S-
REITs and its unit holders some breather to rebalance their financial positions. 
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Better Year Ahead 
 
Credit spreads are expected to decline further as the economy continues to recover while 
the underlying fundamentals improve. An easing of the credit environment coupled with 
recapitalised balance sheets and compressing dividend yields are expected to revive 
acquisitions and project development in the S-REIT sector in 2010. 
 
As equity market conditions continue to improve, more REIT listings are expected since 
sources and cost of funds are now relatively low. Some initial public offerings that had 
been delayed may come to market as S-REIT valuations continue to be attractive. 
Mapletree and Temasek Holdings has reported their intentions to spin off a few of their 
properties into REITs in the coming months. ARA Asset Management which launch Cache 
in April 2010, is working with Regency Group to list a Syariah-compliant S-REIT in the 
second half of 2010. 
 
The FTSE REIT index is up 2.3%, year-to-date at 632.16 points (as at 12 July 2010), a 
gain of 126% against its March 2009 low. Valuations for several larger cap REITs are 
trading at a premium to book value. 
THE outlook for Asia-Pacific REITs has improved significantly this year, going by a poll of 
property market players. More respondents expect existing REITs to expand and new 
ones to come on stream. Many also see Singapore offering the most potential for REITs to 
develop.  
Corporate trustee The Trust Company and law firm Baker & McKenzie conducted the 
2010 Asia-Pacific REITs Survey from January to March, polling 140 people including 
property owners and fund managers from 13 markets. 
 
The proportion of optimists this year is far larger than that last year. When the survey was 
conducted during the economic downturn, just 20 per cent of respondents thought existing 
REITs would expand, and a mere 3 per cent felt that there would be new ones. 
'Although the short term outlook has not recovered to pre-global financial crisis levels, 
positive sentiment is improving,' the survey owners said in a report. 
 
Respondents also rated the 13 markets on their potential for REITs, and Singapore 
retained pole position from last year with the highest median score of 62 out of 100. 
Australia was a close second with 61 points, and China came in third with a score of 56. 
Hong Kong was in fourth place and Japan ranked ninth. 
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Participants assessed real estate growth prospects, opportunities and regulatory support 
in the 13 markets to arrive at the scores. Singapore came out tops in offering regulatory 
support, but seemed less attractive than China, India and Australia in terms of how much 
its property sector could grow. There is 'strong opportunity in China but it will take a while 
before things happen as China's legal and tax framework needs to be developed a lot 
more to make a REITs successful', the survey owners said. 
 
Meanwhile, respondents see 'adverse taxation developments' as the biggest threat to 
REITs. What they feared most last year were the 'effects of financial engineering'. 
 
Analysts expect Singapore to be Asia’s fastest growing economy in 2010, on the back of 
increasing tourist numbers, rising employment and strong manufacturing numbers. GDP 
growth estimates by the official Ministry of Trade and Industry is 7% to 9%, while 
Bloomberg forecast estimates 9.7% to 13%. Though Singapore’s economic numbers are 
strong, the global growth is moderating due to mixed economic data in the U.S. and the 
threat of fiscal austerity measures in solving sovereign debt problems in Europe.  This 
would impact Singapore’s economy. As such, OCBC investment research is more 
cautious about multi-geography REITs and preferred local skewed retail or industrial 
REITs. One of its picks is FraserCT, which focuses exclusively on local suburban retail. 
 
5.5 S-REITs Capital Returns 
 
The REIT index has traded in-line with the broad market as shown from figure 5.1. It has 
even underperformed the broad market over a 2.5 year horizon. 
 
2006 was a year with good returns performance as all the 7 S-REITs share prices raised 
an average of 37.7%. End of 2007, effects of Sub-prime crisis began to set in and affected 
11 out of the 15 S-REITs. Investors with S-REITs units, suffer from losses as all were 
affected by the dimmed economic sentiments. The major concern was the ability for the S-
REITs to refinance their substantial borrowings during the credit crunch when banks were 
deleveraging, reducing loan originations and scrutinising the borrowers’ financial status.  
 
S-REITs share prices began to recover in 2009, as the refinancing needs were addressed 
when varies government pumped up liquidity in the global credit market. Those investors 
with foresight and brave enough in 2008 to buy up some of the S-REITs with creditable 
sponsors could have sold them and made an average return of 60.9%. 
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In the first half of 2010, the S-REITs returns are moderated amidst economic uncertainties 
and news of sovereign securities woes in Europe. 
 
Table 5.1 : S-REITs Capital Returns 
S-REIT 
Dec 
05 
($) 
Dec 
06 
($) 
Gain 
(%) 
Dec 
07 
($) 
Gain 
(%) 
Dec 
08 
($) 
Gain 
(%) 
Dec 
09 ($) 
Gain 
(%) 
Jun 
10 ($) 
Gain 
(%) 
CMT 2.24 2.91 29.9 3.46 18.9 1.59 -54.0 1.80 13.2 1.84 2.2 
AREIT 1.95 2.67 36.9 2.46 -7.9 1.37 -44.3 2.22 62.0 1.82 -18.0 
CCT 1.48 2.62 77.0 2.44 -6.9 0.90 -63.3 1.17 30.7 1.22 4.3 
SuntecReit 1.08 1.82 68.5 1.71 -6.0 0.71 -58.5 1.35 90.1 1.32 -2.2 
MapleLog 0.96 1.19 24.6 1.09 -8.4 0.35 -67.9 0.79 124.3 0.84 6.4 
K-REIT - 2.50 - 2.13 -14.8 0.70 -67.1 1.10 57.1 1.14 3.6 
CDL HTrust - 1.67 - 2.35 40.7 0.73 -68.9 1.75 139.7 1.75 0.0 
Starhill Gbl 0.95 1.17 23.2 1.10 -6.0 0.52 -52.7 0.525 1.0 0.56 5.7 
FrasersCT - 1.53 - 1.46 -4.6 0.63 -56.8 1.40 122.2 1.3 -7.1 
Fortune Reit 
HKD 5.70 5.90 3.5 5.21 -11.7 1.99 -61.8 3.13 57.3 3.55 13.4 
PLife - - - 1.13 - 0.76 -32.7 1.22 60.5 1.36 11.5 
IndiaBulls - - - - - 0.26 - 0.26 0.0 0.25 -3.8 
CRT - 2.10 - 2.15 2.4 0.60 -72.1 1.28 113.3 1.24 -3.1 
AiT - - - 1.28 - 0.46 -64.1 0.98 113.0 0.94 -4.1 
Ascott - 1.60 - 1.45 -9.4 0.58 -60.0 1.20 106.9 1.13 -5.8 
LMIR - - - 0.67 - 0.31 -53.4 0.51 62.9 0.48 -5.9 
Cambridge - 0.80 - 0.71 -11.3 0.28 -61.3 0.45 63.6 0.5 10.0 
FrasersCom - 1.11 - 0.9 -19.4 0.24 -73.7 0.14 -40.4 0.14 0.0 
AIMS - - - 1.10 - 0.26 -76.8 0.22 -15.7 0.215 2.3 
FirstReit - 0.76 - 0.77 1.3 0.41 -47.4 0.82 101.2 0.86 4.9 
Saizen - - - 0.89 - 0.13 -85.4 0.15 15.4 0.16 6.7 
Average - - 37.7 - -2.9 - -61.1 - 60.9 - 1.0 
 Source: SGX 
 
5.6 S-REITs Prices 
 
As of July 2010, the S-REITs average yield is about 7.9%. The share prices are trading at 
an average of 0.89 times their NAV and have not crossed the unit mark since the decline 
in mid 2008. 
 
Out of the 22 listed S-REITs, only prices of 8 S-REITs are at a premium to their NAV. 
These are the ones that have stronger sponsors like CapitaLand and Ascendas or with 
better expected income such as CDL HTrust as tourism improves or stable sources of 
earnings in the case of PLife’s healthcare real estate. Their yields are compressed to 
about 4% to 5%. This would improve these REITs’ ability to raise equity funds and make 
accretive acquisitions. 
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Table 5.2 : S-REITs Financial Ratios 
Name of 
REIT 
Market 
Cap 
(SGD m) 
Price 
(SGD) Yield (%) 
NAV per 
unit 
(SGD) 
Discount 
(%) 
Price to 
Book Ratio 
(times) 
Gearing 
(%) 
CMT 6,264.980 1.97 4.5 1.56 - 1.26 30.5 
AREIT 3,742.308 2.00 4.7 1.57 - 1.27 31.6 
CCT 3,714.368 1.32 5.3 1.39 5.0 0.95 33.2 
SuntecReit 2,618.529 1.40 8.4 1.774 21.1 0.79 33.3 
MapleLog 1,756.439 0.855 6.2 0.87 1.7 0.98 36.7 
K-REIT 1,629.948 1.22 6.4 1.48 17.6 0.82 25.2 
CDL HTrust 1,549.736 1.85 4.6 1.41 - 1.31 19.1 
Starhill Gbl 1,122.494 0.58 9.8 0.82 29.3 0.71 26.9 
FrasersCT 1,062.235 1.39 5.4 1.23 - 1.13 29.7 
Fortune Reit 
HKD 1,040.540 3.54 8.5 0.934 33.0 0.67 23.7 
PLife 869.761 1.44 5.4 1.39 - 1.04 27.4 
IndiaBulls 850.498 0.235 - 0.544 56.8 0.43 27.0 
CRT 784.797 1.26 6.5 1.09 - 1.16 33.6 
AiT 746.655 0.98 7.7 0.9 - 1.09 36.4 
Ascott 728.438 1.18 6.2 1.32 10.6 0.89 41.2 
Cache 622.717 0.985 - 0.87 - 1.13 25.9 
LMIR 522.061 0.485 10.4 0.839 42.2 0.58 10.5 
Cambridge 445.341 0.51 10.5 0.593 14.0 0.86 42.6 
FrasersCom 427.418 0.14 11.7 0.28 50.0 0.50 40.4 
AIMS 322.652 0.22 19.0 0.31 29.0 0.71 28.9 
FirstReit 243.794 0.885 8.6 0.98 9.9 0.90 15.5 
Saizen 151.871 0.16 - 0.39 59.0 0.41 43.5 
Average 
  
7.9 
  
0.89 
 
  Source: SGX, Shares Investment, Company Quarterly Reports 
  Data as at 16 July 2010 
 
The highest discounted price is Saizen, 59% off its NAV, as the REIT has not been 
performing well. It had not being paying cash dividends in 2009 and nearly defaulted on its 
loan payments because of the weakness in the Japanese residential investments. 
Therefore, with the least market confidence, it is lowly priced by the investors. 
 
5.7 S-REITs Gearing Levels 
 
With reference to table 5.4, in 2009 most of the REITs leverage hovered between 30% 
and 40%, the cost of debts was between 3% to 4% and interest cover 3 to 5 times. In 
2010, referring to table 5.3, majority of the REITs have reduced the gearing levels, except 
for a few which have increased their portfolio assets. 
 
AiT had the highest interest cost partly because of the offshore nature of the assets. In 
spite of this, the financial status was still satisfactory as the interest cover was the highest 
(21.9 times) and the debt level was the lowest (7.7%) amongst the S-REITs. However, the 
gearing ratio has risen to 36.4% in 2010, breaching its target gearing, after some 
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acquisitions. 
 
Table 5.3 : S-REITs Gearing Ratios 
Name of REIT Gearing (%) Mar 2010 
Gearing (%) 
Mar 2009 
CMT 30.5 30.9 
AREIT 31.6 35.3 
CCT 33.2 38.8 
SuntecReit 33.3 34.3 
MapleLog 36.7 38.9 
K-REIT 25.2 27.9 
CDL HTrust 19.1 23.6 
Starhill Gbl 26.9 31.1 
FrasersCT 29.7 29.7 
Fortune Reit 
HKD 23.7 23.7 
PLife 27.4 23.4 
IndiaBulls 27.0 - 
CRT 33.6 31.5 
AiT 36.4 7.7 
Ascott 41.2 38.6 
Cache 25.9 - 
LMIR 10.5 12.3 
Cambridge 42.6 39.9 
FrasersCom 40.4 58.3 
AIMS 28.9 39.1 
FirstReit 15.5 20.6 
Saizen 43.5 46.1 
Source: SGX, Shares Investment, Company Quarterly Reports 
 
The other relatively healthy S-REIT in 2009 was CRT, with the lowest debt cost (2.9%), 
interest cover of 6.1 times and leverage of 31.5%. Another S-REIT with low debt cost 
(2.7%) and high interest cover (7.3 times) was AIMS (Marcarthurcook) with a debt level of 
39.1%. CDL HTrust and PLife also had this similar debt profile. In 2010, while AIMS and 
CDL continue to improve their balance sheet, CRT and PLife did some acquisitions which 
increase the debts levels by about 200 basis points. 
 
The second lowest geared S-REIT in 2009 was LMIR, though its debt cost is relatively 
high. But with a interest cover of 7.9 times and debt due after 2012, the financial status is 
quite sound. It continues to reduce the debt level to 10.5% in 2010 from 12.3% in 2009. 
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Table 5.4 
 
 
 Source : DBS Vickers 
 
In 2009, investors would have to be wary about FrasersCom due to the high debt level of 
58.3%, the highest leverage with lowest interest cover in the sector. The management 
have managed to lower the debt level to 40.4% in 2010. 
 
AIMS’s balance sheet is also clearly in much better shape now. As at end-March, its debt-
to-asset gearing stood at 28.9%, down from as much as 41% before the recapitalisation 
deal. Its net asset value (NAV) as at end-March stood at 31 cents per share, about 30% 
more than the current market price of its units. It has 26 industrial properties worth some 
$657.7 million. On average, the properties are 96%-occupied, versus the industry average 
of 91%. The REIT is holding security deposits that average 9.5 months of rent per 
property, providing it with a good buffer in the event of non-payment by its tenants. The 
weighted average lease expiry is 4.4 years. (OCBC Investment Research 2010) 
 
The management is now looking for ways to drive up its revenue and cash flow. Among 
other things, the manager plans to negotiate rents with its sub-tenants directly as the 
master leases expire. That opens the way for it to raise rentals from 2011, which is when 
the master leases start expiring. About 86% of its property portfolio is under master 
leases. 
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Meanwhile, it is working on a plan to cut the interest costs. For 2010, its borrowing costs 
ballooned to $SGD 13.89 million from SGD 5.86 million the previous year. Even in 4th 
quarter 2010, after the recapitalisation exercise, its borrowing costs is going to be SGD 
3.15 million, about twice the $1.53 million it paid out a year ago. The management 
acknowledged that it is too high, but had no choice then, and see the need to bring a local 
bank. Local banks have a cheaper cost of funds and offer competitive corporate interest 
rates. 
 
It is also looking at other longer-tenor funding options such as bond issues, but will need 
to improve its credit rating to get a good deal. In December, following the recapitalisation 
exercise, Moody’s Investors’ Service upgraded its rating from Caa1 to Ba2, two notches 
below an investment grade rating of Baa3. To get to that investment grade rating, Moody’s 
says the REIT needs to “demonstrate a sustained track record in managing its business 
growth with a prudent mix of long-term debt and equity financing, substantially strengthen 
its business scale and successfully spread out its debt maturity profile”. 
 
There are plans are already under way to strengthen its portfolio. First, it is looking to sell 
a lone property in Japan acquired by the previous management. It may also consider 
offloading other assets that are underperforming, and launch asset-enhancement 
initiatives to improve the revenue potential of properties that it keeps. It aims to be 
positioned broadly across the industrial property sector, holding everything from logistics 
facilities to business parks. By contrast, Ascendas REIT is focused on business parks, 
while Mapletree Logistics Trust and Cache Logistics Trust are solely invested in 
warehouses. 
 
There are differences in attitude on gearing based on the size and strength of the S-REIT. For 
instance, Temasek-backed MapleLog has stated it is comfortable with its leverage of 38.6% debt-
to-assets (May 2010). In fact, it was one of the REITs to retain a medium term target of 45%. In 
contrast, the majority of the S-REIT sector has indicated a target range of 30-35% through the 
cycle. In fact, some of the smaller REITs like Cambridge are still de-leveraging their balance 
sheets. REITs have been de-leveraging through both equity fundraising and increasingly via asset 
divestments. Some REITs have also indicated an interest in proactively re-financing loans both to 
term out loan tenors and also to take advantage of an easing credit environment. With lower 
margins and a low interest rate environment, there is a potential opportunity to increase 
distributable income simply by bringing down interest expense. (OCBC Investment Research 2010) 
 
Divestments have become an important part of REIT strategy, both to de-leverage and also to 
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'refresh the portfolio'. In an effort to bring down its leverage level, Cambridge has fully divested 16 
Tuas Avenue 18A and part of 48 Toh Guan Road, Enterprise Hub (38 out of the 120 strata units) as 
at 31 March 2010. AIMS has also signalled its intention to divest some assets, both as a strategic 
exit out of Japan (where it has only one property) and to refresh its portfolio (it wants to exit a 
couple of Singapore assets that it believes may under-perform in the medium-to long term). (OCBC 
Investment Research 2010) 
 
5.8 S-REITs Index Performance 
 
Table 5.5 : FTSE ST Index Series Performance Report - JUNE 2010 
Index No. of Constituents 
Net 
Mkt 
Cap 
SGD 
(bn) 
1M 
 
Perf 
(%) 
3M 
 
Perf 
(%) 
6M 
 
Perf 
(%) 
YTD 
 
Perf 
(%) 
1 YR 
 
Perf 
(%) 
3 YR 
 
Perf 
(%) 
5 YR 
 
Perf 
(%) 
Yield  
 
(%) 
Straits 
Times 
Index 
(STI) 
30 251.2 3.04 -0.61 -0.65 -0.65 25.39 -8.85 55.12 3.01 
FTSE ST 
Mid Cap 
Index 
50 50.2 3.13 0.15 -0.12 -0.12 36.91 -22.37 51.60 3.59 
FTSE ST 
Small 
Cap 
Index 
120 19.0 4.40 -4.82 -2.32 -2.32 30.23 -40.12 26.26 3.73 
FTSE ST 
All-Share 
Index 
200 320.4 3.13 -0.75 -0.68 -0.68 27.25 -17.26 47.38 3.14 
FTSE ST 
Real 
Estate 
Index 
37 58.6 2.62 -2.06 -3.46 -3.46 27.57 -29.53 60.11 4.01 
FTSE ST 
Real 
Estate 
Investm 
& 
Services 
Index 
17 37.5 2.75 -4.12 -5.84 -5.84 18.24 -28.97 82.44 2.64 
FTSE ST 
REITS 
Index 
20 21.1 2.41 1.86 1.07 1.07 48.52 -30.35 18.17 6.44 
Source: FTSE Group – total return data in SGD, as at 30 June 2010, FTSE ST Indices were launched on 10 Jan 2008. 
 
The recent past year, the S-REIT Index performance is remarkable against the other 
indices. Its 3 month, 6 month, year to date and 1 year performance was the best 
compared to the other 6 indices listed below.  Moreover, the yield of 6.44% is also the 
highest amongst the other indices. In other words, S-REIT prices gain more in the last 3 
months, 6 months and 1 year compared to the STI top 30 stocks. However, its 
performance over the 5 year and 3 period was not as good, being the last and the second 
worst respectively. That means that investors who bought the REITs units 1 year ago 
make a better return (higher capital gains) compare to 5 or 3 years ago. 
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5.9 S-REITs Volatility 
 
As with all other equities instruments, REITs would definitely be subjected to price 
volatility. Compared to STI and the FTSE ST all-share index, the REIT index is more 
volatile in the past 1, 3 and 5 years and slightly better than the other Real Estate 
Investment & Services Index. Simply put, the S-REIT prices fluctuate more than the STI 
top 30 stocks and all other shares but less when compared to other property companies. 
 
Table 5.6 : STI and FTSE ST Volatility Table (SGD Total Return) 
     Volatility  
 
1 yr (%pa) * 3 yr (%pa) ** 5 yr (%pa) ** 
STI 22.6 29.4 23.9 
FTSE ST All-Share Index 22.8 32.0 26.1 
FTSE ST Real Estate Index 28.8 35.4 29.8 
FTSE ST Real Estate 
Investment & Services Index 32.5 38.3 32.5 
FTSE ST REIT Index 27.0 35.0 29.2 
 * Base on daily total returns and annualised based on 260 trading days in a year 
 ** Based on monthly total returns 
 Source FTSE Group, data as at 31 March 2010 
 
 
5.10 Summary and Comments 
 
Each type of S-REITs has its strength and weakness due to its profile of underlying assets 
and experience of the manager. In the financial crisis, government support via regulation 
has offered some help for the S-REITs to get through the ordeal. 
 
From the observations in the above sections, it can be concluded that S-REITs may not 
always be defensive and the REITs prices could fluctuate as much during the crises. 
Theoretically, S-REITs could complement other asset classes in a portfolio, but not all 
risks can be diversified away. 
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Chapter 6  Conclusion 
 
6.1  Observations and Deductions 
 
This study into the background of the S-REITs revealed that the major sponsors and 
managers are government link corporations like CapitaLand, Ascendas, Keppel Land and 
Mapletree. The Singapore sovereign fund has invested into half of the S-REITs. It is 
reported that there would be more spin offs and pipelines real estates for their related S-
REITs. Therefore, it can be held that the main supply and demand side drivers are from 
the sovereign investment company’s efforts to transfer its illiquid private asset holdings 
into the liquid public market. This could recycle funds for other investments and at the 
same time, retain control over the assets. 
 
The other observation is that majority of the S-REITs are ‘Captive’ REITs as they have 
close association with their sponsors. These REITs could still have the interests of the 
sponsors and retail investors positively aligned. Moreover, in difficult times strong 
sponsors could serve as “lenders of last resort” or inject confidence to equity raising 
exercise by underwriting excess units. 
 
ALL the S-REITs are managed by external but related managers. There are debates on 
the performance efficiency of internal versus external managed REIT models. 
Nevertheless, the present situation in Singapore is satisfactory with the limited pool of 
professional external asset and fund managers in creating unit holders’ wealth. The fact 
that the sponsor retains a considerable number of units and is the parent company of the 
manager, plays a part in aligning the interest and limiting the agency problem. 
 
As seen from the failure of SPT, the timing of IPO and pricing is important. Sponsors 
would have to cautiously gauge the investors’ receptive levels and market sentiments 
before proceeding with primary or even secondary listings. Investors in S-REITs are more 
supportive of strong sponsors and management teams as shown from the premium price 
to book value. 
 
Another observation is the more than half of the S-REITs are having overseas properties. 
It is partly due to the government policy to encourage overseas participants in the local 
financial markets in order to widen the variety of investments and broaden the base of the 
local market investors. The main aim of this is to establish Singapore as a regional REITs 
hub as well as the status as a global financial centre. Apparently, the other reason is that 
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Singapore’s supply of institutional investment grade properties is limited. 
 
The lessons that are learned from the crisis are as follows : 
 REITs investment may not always be defensive; it has its set of risks. Those that 
increase their leverage to expand their portfolio and earnings via acquisitions are more 
prone to market risks.  
 REITs with prudent borrowing strategies are less vulnerable to financial risks. 
 Financing growth through short-term loans causes liquidity mismatched. Diversifying 
financing options helps to reduce refinancing risks during liquidity crunches. 
 
6.2  Caveats to REITs Investors 
 
The advent of REITs has enabled companies, which are historically asset heavy to ‘lighten 
up’. It is an alternative route to free up capital resources or to realise the assets values 
while continuing to enjoy the property rental income as unit holders. Capital and labour 
that were previously used to maintain the property can now be transferred to more 
productive activities. 
 
By bundling properties together and issuing units on these properties, REITs effectively 
divide chunky property investments into smaller and more affordable units that can be 
listed on the stock exchange, making it more attractive and improved the liquidity. 
 
REITs have also provided retail and institutional investors an alternative way of directly 
investing into property investment. Before the arrival of REITs, the only option was to 
allocate large sums to acquire such investments. To compound matters, the hefty capital 
outlay and illiquidity make it difficult for many small investors to diversify within this market 
or avoid it altogether.  
 
With REITs, investors can increase their stakes on properties, without sacrificing on 
liquidity. As various types and more S-REITs get listed, investors can enjoy better 
diversification and more choices. 
 
Though REITs are well-regulated by authorities, investors must still exercise careful 
judgement in choosing their investment choices, just like any other type of investments 
decisions. There are several considerations before investing in REITs. Basically, the 
quality of management and its track records are important. Be aware of how aggressive 
they are in making acquisitions, the gearing ratios, and how are the leaseback agreements 
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structured. Investors should also scrutinise the asset quality, rental yields and quality of 
tenants. Most importantly, the level of disclosure and corporate governance must be high, 
enabling all investors to make sound investment decisions.  
 
Advice for the investors is, the classic doctrines still hold, ‘not putting all your eggs in one 
basket’ and caveat emptor. Though analyst always advocate REITs as defensive 
investments with minimal downside risks and good upside potential in the current 
recovering economy, but there is still the concern about the refinancing risks for higher 
leverage REITs with weak sponsors. 
 
6.3  Challenges Ahead - Competitors 
 
REITs have no doubt made significant impact in Singapore over a short period of 8 years. 
As the S-REITs market matured, there would be more challenges ahead for various 
parties in the REIT market: sponsors, trust and asset managers, professional valuers and 
financial advisors, stock exchange, regulator and investors. While it is essential to 
continue to strengthen the governance and operation structure in Singapore REIT market, 
the government also strives to turn Singapore into a regional REIT hub, which will give 
regional REITs a direct and ready access to capital. The regulator has always been urged 
to make cross-border REITs in Singapore more attractive:  
 
“It would be an interesting challenge to see if Singapore can be a hub for another 
30 to 50 of the top quality Asian REITs over the next 10 to 20 years.”  
 - Ms Ho Ching, the Chief Executive, Temasek Holdings  
 
A REIT hub could also be a place where knowledge and expertise in REIT could be 
outsourced to REITs from other markets. The appointment of CapitaLand as a strategic 
partner of the Link REIT management, the first and the largest REIT IPO that was re-
launched in Hong Kong after clearing the legal obstacles is an important recognition of the 
REIT expertise of Singapore companies.  
 
Competition would apparently be more intense when the other regional markets actively 
gear up to pave ways for REIT listings in their respective bourses. Japan is clearly the 
leader in Asia REIT markets in terms of its current market capitalization and the number of 
J-REIT listing. Malaysia and Hong Kong would be Singapore’s foremost competitors in the 
regional REIT markets. 
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REITs are global investment vehicles, but real estate assets are local in nature. The game 
of REIT would depend on the cost efficiency of listing on different markets. Clearly, the 
playing fields are now more level considering various tax incentives and waivers granted 
by various governments to entice REIT listing on their respective markets. While 
Singapore might not dominate the REIT game by attracting all regional REITs to list on 
Singapore market, the government could, however, continue to provide incentives and 
supports to encourage more Singapore companies to establish cross-border REITs 
holding overseas properties on other bourses as a strategy to expand their portfolios.  
 
6.4  Regulations and Corporate Responsibilities  
 
The challenge to sponsors and managers is to continue improving standard of 
transparency and corporate social governance. This would encourage more overseas 
investors or sponsors to participate in the S-REITs market, broadening the variety of 
financial investments and deepening the base of local investors. The government could 
encourage this through dialogues and regulations changes, with the intention to maintain 
Singapore market as an established cross border REITs hub. 
 
The main attraction of foreign investments to Singapore is its business friendly 
environment and regulated markets with transparent policies. The local economy is 
opened but fairly stable due to the regulators hands-on approach. Though Singapore has 
been teased as a “nanny state”, but part of the success of the S-REIT markets is due to 
the regulator. It makes the necessary policy amendments so that S-REIT could survive 
through the liquidity crunch. 
 
6.5 Summary  
 
The financial crisis in 2007, has stop S-REITs’ growth strategy via aggressive yield 
accretive acquisition and refocus on a more defensive approach, that is to deleverage and 
preserve cash flows. Such a move strengthens their financial positions and resilience to 
brave a more volatile market. It also conserves “ammunition” for REITs to grow when the 
market sentiments improved.  
 
To conclude, the global economic conditions are dynamic, investors, sponsors, managers 
and regulators would always be challenged when the markets fluctuate. The lessons 
learnt in this financial crisis might help them get through the next one and it might not if the 
underlying factors are different.
 Page 59 
References : 
 
Bodie, Z, Kane, A and Marcus, A (2008), Investments, Mc Graw Hill. 
 
 Chatrath, A (1998), ‘REITs and Inflation: A long-run perspective’ , The Journal of Real 
Estate Research. 
 
Dominic Whiting (2007), Playing the REITs GAME, Asia New Real Estate 
InvestmentTrusts, John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Eitman, D K, Stonehill, A I and Moffett, M H (2007), Multinational Business Finance, 
Pearson International. 
 
Eichengreen, B (2004), ‘Financial Development in Asia: The Way Forward’, Economic 
Society of Singapore. 
 
Hui, T S, Sing, T F and I-Chun, T (2006), ‘Are there efficiency gains for larger Asian 
REITs’, Journal of Financial Management of Property and Construction, vol.14, iss. 3, pp. 
231-247. 
 
Horngren, C T, Bhimani, A, Datar S M and Foster, G (2005), Management and Cost 
Accounting, Prentice Hall 
 
Lijian Chen and Thomas I. Mills (2010), ‘Global Real Estate Investable Universe 
Continues to Expand and Develop’ in Graeme Newell Karen Sieracki (ed.), Global Trends 
in Real Estate Finance, John Wiley & Sons. 
 
McMahan, J (1994), ‘The long view – A perspective on the REIT market’, American 
Society of Real Estate Counselors. 
 
Mei, A H N (2002), ‘Is there a Business Case for REITs in Singapore’, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. 
 
Ooi, J T L, Newell, G and Sing, T F (2006), ‘The Growth of REIT Markets in Asia, Journal 
of Real Estate Literature, vol.14, no.2, pp. 203-222. 
 
 
 Page 60 
Ong, S E, Ooi, J T L and Neo, P H (2007), ‘The Wealth Effects of Yield-Accretive 
Acquisitions: The Case of Asian REITs’. 
 
Philip Conner, Parmerica Financial (Jan 2005), ‘Global REITs: A New Platform of 
Ownership’ 
 
Quek, M C H and Ong, S E (2008), ‘Securitsing China real estate: a tale of two China-
centric REITs’, Journal of Property Investment and Finance, v 26 iss 3, pp. 247-274. 
 
Ralph L. Block ( 3rd edition, 2006), Invessting in REITs, Bloomberg Press, New York. 
 
Ross, S A, Westerfield R W and Jaffe, J (2005), Corporate Finance, Mc Graw Hill. 
 
Sing, T F (2009), ‘Can Asian REITs weather the financial storm?’. 
 
Sing, T F (2007), ‘Asian REIT Hub: Is Singapore on track to realizing the goal?’. 
 
Sing, T F (2006), ‘Cross-border S-REITs: Opportunities and Challenges’. 
 
Sing, T F (2005), ‘Challenges ahead for S-REITs’. 
 
Sing, T F and Ling, S C (2003), ‘The Role of Singapore REITs in a Downside Risk Asset 
Allocation Framework’, Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, vol. 9, no.3, pp.219-
235. 
 
www.asiaone.com.sg 
 
www.bloomberg.com 
 
www.ft.com 
 
www.ftse.com 
 
www.ocbcresearch.com 
 
www.sgx.com 
 
www.sharesinv.com 
 
 
